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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Are suicide bombings courageous actions? 1 Consider the following case. An
insurgent fighter, Marwan, prepares for a suicide bombing mission. Marwan is to run
into a military compound wearing an explosive vest in order to blow up a platoon of
enemy troops who are responsible for killing or capturing at least forty members of
Marwan’s tribe. Marwan wants to carry out this mission so that his tribe and family will
be safer. Marwan’s command has planned this mission so that no civilians will be
harmed, and Marwan knows this. Also, his command has rigged the vest to detonate if it
is removed. His vest is set to detonate at 13:30:00, or at an earlier time if Marwan
triggers it. The day before the bombing, Marwan ponders his mission. Marwan knows
that this mission will mean certain death for him. Surprisingly though, Marwan is not
frightened by this thought. He is so focused on the details of his mission and so excited
by the thought that success will mean safety for his tribe and family, that he does not fear
dying. The next morning, Marwan awakens for his mission. He eats breakfast and prays
briefly. His serenity and lack of fear is astonishing. One hour prior to the mission, he
puts on his vest. At this point, there is no turning back. It is no longer possible for
Marwan not to perform his mission. Shortly after, Marwan is taken to the drop-off point.
He dismounts quickly and runs for the gate of the military compound. He manages to
avoid some heavy machine gun fire and quickly approaches his target. Marwan calmly
glances at his watch and notices that it is 13:29:55, five seconds prior to automatic
1
I use ‘action’ synonymously with ‘act token.’ Following Fred Feldman, I define act token (or
action )
as something that occurs just once, has just one agent, and just one time of occurrence, a
concrete
particular.
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detonation. He knows now that he and his target will be blasted whether or not he wants
to go though with it. But even this thought does not frighten Marwan. Marwan does
want to go through with it. Again, he wants to make sure that his tribe and family will be
safer. Marwan explodes and is successful in killing thirty enemy soldiers and himself.
Marwan is praised for his courageous action and considered a hero by his family and
tribe.
Is Marwan’ s action courageous? I don’t think the answer is clear. Various
questions come up when we try to figure out whether certain actions are courageous. We
might wonder if it is necessary for an action’s being courageous that the agent performing
it feels fear. Marwan doesn’t. Does this mean that Marwan’s action is not courageous?
Or perhaps all that is required is that the agent faces some danger. But assuming this is
right, what types of danger count for courageous actions? One would think that
Marwan’s does. Or we might wonder whether a courageous action must be one in which
it is possible for the agent not to perform it. At 13:29:55, Marwan has no choice but to
perform his action. Does this disqualify his action from being courageous? Does
morality have anything to do with whether an action is courageous? Is courage a
normative concept? Perhaps an action is courageous only if it is morally right. And if
this is the case, then what should we say about Marwan’s action?
It is not clear whether Marwan’s action and other suicide bombings are
courageous. But I think that this lack of clarity stems more from our lack of
understanding of the nature of courageous actions than from our lack ot knowledge about
these cases. For even when we make certain assumptions regarding these actions, the
answer to the question of whether they are courageous remains unclear. So before we
2
even attempt to answer the question of whether suicide bombing are courageous actions,
we’ll need to have a clear account of a courageous action. We need to know what the
necessary and sufficient conditions are for an action’s being courageous. Now while the
exact constituents of such an account may not be clear to us, we can all recognize some
paradigm courageous and non-courageous actions. There are certain actions that we just
know are courageous, and others that we know are not. We can use these paradigm cases
to develop a plausible account of a courageous action.
The goal of this thesis is provide a plausible and informative account of a
courageous action that will allow us to answer the question of whether suicide bombings
are courageous. This account will be plausible only if it meets our intuitions about
paradigm courageous and non-courageous actions. It will be informative only if it gives
us a clear set of necessary and sufficient conditions that will enable us to determine,
given some assumptions, whether certain actions are courageous. I’ll proceed as follows.
In chapters 2-5, I’ll present and evaluate some existing accounts of courage. Although I
will ultimately argue that all of these accounts are false, the lessons that we can learn
from them will assist us in developing a plausible and informative account of a
courageous action. In chapter 6, I’ll present and defend my account of a courageous
action. After arguing for my account, I’ll then turn to the main question of this thesis in
chapter 7 : Are suicide bombings courageous?
Before I begin, I’d like to make clear some metaphysical and semantic
assumptions that I make regarding the property of being courageous. I think that being
courageous is a real objective property. That is, it is an objective fact about certain
actions that they are courageous. And I think that the property of being courageous is a
3
complex or analyzable property. That is, we can analyze the property of being
courageous into simpler more fundamental properties. Also, the property of being
courageous is not a relation between actions or people and a religion, society, or culture
.
2
It is simply a property of some actions. Similarly, on the semantic level, ‘is courageous’
is a one-place predicate predicable of actions. It is not a two-place predicate of actions
and a religion, society, or culture
.
3
Furthermore, when we utter sentences like ‘Marwan’s
suicide bombing is courageous,’ we are saying something that is either true or false. We
are making a statement or expressing a proposition.
Finally, one might wonder whether the correct analysis of a courageous action is
something like the following:
An action is courageous if, and only if, it is one that is typically performed
by a courageous person.
I think that this analysis is uninformative, but more importantly, it is false. For one, it
seems likely that there are many different types of actions that are typically performed by
courageous people. This may be true about dangerous or good actions. But dangerous or
good actions are not always courageous ones. So while it may be true that an action’s
being one that is typically formed by a courageous person is a necessary condition for its
being courageous, it seems clear that it is not sufficient. And even if we agree that this
condition is necessary for an action’s being courageous, it is not very informative. I think
we can do better than this. I think that we can give a plausible and informative account
2
Let ‘C’ = ‘the property of being courageous’, ‘a’ = ‘some action’, and ‘s’ = ‘some society culture, or
religion’. Attributions of courage are of the form C(a) and not of the form C(a,s). This terminology is
borrowed from Feldman in his discussion on moral relativism from “Phil 563 Handout 4.”
3 So sentences like ‘Marwan’s suicide bombing is courageous’ is complete in meaning. It is not short for
‘Marwan’s suicide bombing is courageous for terrorists.’ So the truth conditions of sentences containing
the predicate ‘is courageous’ are affected only by the action it is predicated ot, and not some religion,
society, or culture. This terminology is also borrowed from Feldman’s “Phil 563 Handout 4.
4
of a courageous action that does not refer to the concept of a courageous person. This is
not to say that the conditions ot this account will not refer to certain psychological
conditions of the agent performing the action. I think that any plausible account of a
courageous action will have to say something about certain doxastic or epistemic states of
the agent. But we need not refer to the concept of a courageous person when forming this
account .
4
4 One might wonder if the following account of a courageous person is plausible: A person is courageous
if, and only if he typically performs courageous actions. I am inclined to think that this account is also
false. Perhaps it is plausible that this condition is necessary for a courageous person, but I am doubtful
about its sufficiency. Regardless, this discussion is beyond the scope of my thesis and so I am not
committed to any account of a courageous person.
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CHAPTER 2
DICTIONARY ACCOUNT OF A COURAGEOUS ACTION
2-1 : Fear as Necessary and Sufficient for an Action’s Beintz Courageous
Perhaps the most reasonable place to begin is with a common dictionary
definition of courage. The Compact Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘courage’ as
“the ability to do something that frightens one.” While this is a definition for ‘courage’
as a trait of character, I think we can translate this definition into one that defines
‘courage’ as a property of actions.
5
We’ll call this the “Dictionary Account of a
Courageous Action” or “DACA”. We can formulate DACA as the following:
DACA: For any action, a
,
and any agent performing a, x, a is courageous
if, and only if, x is frightened while performing a b
So according to DACA, one’s fearing his action while performing it is necessary and
sufficient for his action’s being courageous. But while fear often seems to be involved in
paradigm cases of courage, it is hard to see how this is sufficient for it. Consider the
following case. People are always telling Mike that he is courageous. However, Mike
doubts whether or not this is true. One day Mike decides that he will test his courage by
playing Russian roulette by himself. Mike figures that this will be the ultimate test ot his
5
1 make this same translation (from ‘courage’ as a trait of character to ‘courageous’ as a property of
actions) later in this chapter. I also do the same when developing Plato’s account of a courageous action in
chapter 3. Perhaps these accounts of courage as a trait of character are not meant to be translatable into
accounts of a courageous action. While 1 recognize this possibility, 1 will assume for the purposes of this
thesis that they are translatable.
6
I take it that fear (or at least the relevant type) is a conscious experience. That is, if one fears performing
an action, then he knows this. In comments on a previous draft, Feldman pointed out that some might
object to this by arguing that one can sub-consciously fear performing an action. And that this fear might
be manifested in other ways (i.e. increased heart rate). Perhaps this is right, but it seems to me that those
who believe fear to be necessary for a courageous action mean it to be a conscious experience. Because of
this, I will be evaluating the necessity of fear as a conscious experience for courageous actions.
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courage. As Mike grabs his revolver, his hands begin to shake. The danger is now very
real to Mike. However, committed to testing his courage, Mike loads one bullet, spins
the chamber, puts the gun to his head, and hesitantly pulls the trigger. Mike is relieved to
still be alive. Satisfied that he is truly courageous, Mike puts the gun away.
Now, it is very obvious from this example that this action is very frightening for
Mike. In fact, it’s hard to imagine a more frightening experience. We can imagine the
sweat pouring off of Mike’s forehead and his hands trembling as he raises the revolver to
his head. It s just Mike against this overwhelming fear, and he manages to overcome it to
perform his action. Equally obvious is that Mike’s action is not courageous. It’s difficult
to say exactly why this is the case, but perhaps it’s the fact that Mike unnecessarily puts
his life in jeopardy. It might be impressive that Mike is able to overcome his fear of
death in pulling the trigger, in the same way that people who are able to overcome their
fear of death in other death-defying acts are impressive. But there is something senseless
about his action. Mike is merely attempting to prove his “courage.” And this end does
not seem to warrant the risk of losing his life. It seems more appropriate to call this
action ‘senseless’ or ‘reckless’ than ‘courageous.’ Now, ifDACA is true, then it entails
that Mike’s action is courageous. But since it is clear that Mike’s action is not
courageous, it follows that DACA is false.
2.2: Fear as Necessary for an Action’s Being Courageous
But perhaps fearing an action, although not sufficient, is necessary for an action s
being courageous. I said earlier that fear often seems to be involved in paradigm cases ol
courageous actions. But is it required for all courageous actions? Some philosophers
7
have thought this to be the case. Aristotle seems to be one of them. In The Nicomachean
Ethics
,
he writes. The man, then, who laces and who fears the right things and from the
right motive, in the right way and at the right time, and who feels confidence under the
corresponding conditions, is brave...” (1 147bl7). 7 So Aristotle thinks that fear, under
the appropriate conditions, is necessary for a courageous action. And while this might be
better than requiring fear under any conditions, I think that there are many courageous
actions where an agent does something impressive and dangerous, but he does it in a
calm and cool manner, and without any fear. In Virtues and Vices . James Wallace makes
a similar point. He writes, “An agent, in performing a courageous act, need not feel any
fear at all, nor need he feel the act difficult. We admire the courage of someone who
does something very dangerous so coolly that it appears to be easy for him” (80). I think
Wallace is right. Let’s consider this real life example. Sergeant Roy Benavidez was a
Special Forces soldier during the Vietnam War. On May 2, 1968, Sergeant Benavidez
was back at his camp listening to a radio to monitor the status of twelve of his teammates
who were on a dangerous reconnaissance mission over the Cambodian border. The
mission quickly became a failure and his teammates were very close to being killed or
captured by an overwhelming force. Helicopters were sent in to evacuate the men but
were forced to turn back because of small arms fire. In Why Courage Matters , John
McCain writes:
Listening on the radio, Benavidez heard one of his friends scream, “Get us
out of here!” and, “So much shooting it sounded like a popcorn machine."
He jumped into one of the returning helicopters, volunteering for a second
evacuation attempt. When he arrived at the scene, he found that none ol
the patrol had made it to the landing zone. Four were already dead,
including the team leader, and the other eight were wounded and unable to
7
1 take it that Aristotle uses ‘brave’ synonymously with ‘courageous.’ Thanks to Feldman lor
pointing out
this passage to me. See also note 5.
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move. Carrying a knife and a medic bag, Benavidez made the sign of the
cross, leapt from the helicopter hovering ten feet off the ground, and ran
seventy yards to his injured comrades. Before he reached them, he was
shot in the leg, face, and head. He got up and kept moving. (6-7)
In the end, after fighting off the enemy for nearly six hours and sustaining many more
injuries, Benavides successfully loaded up all the wounded and himself to be extracted.
Let’s assume that Benavidez was not afraid during his rescue attempt. 8 He was
certainly aware of the great danger of performing his action. And he was repeatedly
reminded of this danger each time he was wounded. However, Benavidez’s concern for
his teammates along with his training instincts allowed him to perform this action without
feeling any fear. It’s almost as if Benavidez was in some sort of “zone” in performing his
action. Soldiers and other heroic figures often talk like this when describing their
courageous actions. But an agent not fearing from being in a “zone” does not seem to
merit disqualifying actions of this type as courageous. The agents are still very aware of
the danger of their actions and what they are doing, but they are so focused that they are
never conscious of any fear. But if it’s right that fearing an action is necessary for
courage, then it follows that Benavidez’s action is not courageous. And I think this is
clearly false. Perhaps Benavidez’s action is courageous because of the great danger that
Benavidez overcomes to perform his action, or the fact that he volunteered for this
mission, or that he believed that saving his teammates was worth the risk, or that it was
the morally right thing to do. Whatever the reason, it seems clear that Benavidez's action
is courageous in spite of the fact that he did not feel any fear while performing it.
But perhaps fear in some other way is necessary. That is, perhaps it's right that it
is not necessary that the agent feel fear while performing his action. But maybe it is
8
1 realize that this is perhaps a rather large assumption to make, but 1 only hope to show that, even given
this assumption, Benavidez’s action is nonetheless courageous.
9
necessary that the thought of performing his action (before he actually does it) frightens
the agent. So although Benavidez’s adrenaline and focus prevent him from feeling any
fear while performing his action, he probably felt fear at the thought of his action during
the helicopter ride over. And this tear, prior to performing the action, is what is
necessary for his action s being courageous. Along this reasoning, one might propose
that an action is courageous only if the thought of performing the action frightens the
agent. But I think that this is also false. I think that there are also courageous actions that
are so spontaneous that the agent has no time to fear even the thought of performing his
action. Douglas Walton, whose account of courage we will be considering later, offers
an example of this. In Courage: A Philosophical Investigation
.
Walton writes:
Take an example of a soldier who throws himself on a grenade without
hesitation or time for forethought, saving several of his platoon in a trench
but losing his own life. It seems we want to say his act is truly courageous
even if we do not think there was time for him to exhibit or experience
fear before he acted. (135)
Of course, one will likely need to make some assumptions to characterize this action as
courageous. For instance, we might want to assume that this soldier performed his action
with the intention of saving his comrades’ lives. We wouldn't want to call this action
courageous if we thought that he did it to kill himself and escape his duty. But the main
point is that the soldier did not have enough time to fear even the thought of performing
his action. Nevertheless, his action is courageous. If I am right, then it is not necessary
for an action’s being courageous that the agent fears the thought of performing it.
10
2.3: Summary
I have argued that an agent’s fearing while performing his action is neither
necessary nor sufficient for his action’s being courageous. I have also argued the same
regarding the requirement that the agent fear the thought of performing his action.
However, I do not think that an agent’s fearing in either of these two ways disqualifies
his action from being courageous. As I stated earlier, many of our paradigm courageous
actions are ones in which the agent feels fear in one of these two ways. Perhaps what is
essential to courage is that the agent faces some formidable danger, one that he may or
may not fear, in performing his action.
11
CHAPTER 3
PLATO’S ACCOUNT OF A COURAGEOUS ACTION
3.1: Introduction
If one wishes to piece together an account of a courageous action that is
attributable to Plato, he is most likely to profit from a close reading of the Platonic
dialogue. Laches . In this dialogue, Socrates attempts to determine “what courage is”
(190e). His interlocutors, Nicias and Laches, are two distinguished military officers who
offer various definitions of ‘courage’, which Socrates seemingly rejects. In typical
elenctic fashion, we seem to be left with no clear answer to our question at the conclusion
of the dialogue. However, it is certainly plausible that an account of a courageous action
that Plato endorses has been given in the dialogue.9 I think that Plato endorses the view
that an action is courageous if, and only if, it is a case of wise endurance. In this chapter,
I will attempt to do three things. First, I’ 11 make the case that Plato does endorse such a
view. Next, I will make this account of a courageous action more informative by
expanding on the meaning of ‘wise endurance.’ Finally, I will argue that Plato’s account,
although helpful for developing a plausible account of a courageous action, is
nevertheless false.
3.2: Endurance as Necessary for an Action’s Being Courageous
I’ll begin with the idea that endurance is a necessary condition for an action's
being courageous. Early in the dialogue, Laches proposes that endurance is both
necessary and sufficient for courage. He says, “...I think it [courage] is a sort of
9
See note 5.
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endurance of the soul, if it is necessary to say what its nature is in all these cases” ( 1 92c).
Socrates then presents the following argument to show that ‘endurance’ is not sufficient
for defining ‘courage’:
S: Suppose it [endurance] is accompanied by folly? Isn’t it just the
opposite, harmful and injurious?
L: Yes.
S. And you are going to call a thing fine which is of the injurious and
harmful sort?
L: No, that wouldn’t be right, Socrates.
S: Then you won’t allow this kind of endurance to be courage, since it is
not fine, whereas courage is fine.
L: You are right. 10 (192d)
So Socrates argues that endurance cannot be necessary and sufficient for courage since
this would entail that a case of foolish endurance would be courageous. And this cannot
be right since courage is noble, while foolish endurance is not. Socrates’ argument is
valid and while it also seems sound, his objection proves only that endurance is not
sufficient for courage. It might still be the case that endurance is a necessary condition
for courage. In fact there are indications that Plato sees that this is the case. He writes:
S: But are you willing that we should agree with our statement to a certain
extent?
L: To what extent and with what statement?
S: With one that commands us to endure. If you are willing, let us hold
our ground in the search and let us endure, so that courage itself won't
make fun of us for not searching for it courageously—if endurance should
perhaps be courage after all. (194a)
In this text, Plato has Socrates acknowledging and perhaps endorsing the common
intuition that endurance is a necessary component of courage. I think, then, that it is
plausible that Plato holds such a view.
Assuming that I am right that Plato sees endurance as a necessary component ot
courage, we still need some clarification on what is meant by this. It is clear that Plato
10
‘S’= ‘Socrates’; ‘L’= ‘Laches’
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has in mind more than mere physical endurance. This seems clear when Laches
explicitly mentions “endurance of the soul.” I think he has in mind what we would also
call perseverance. The following definition is given for ‘persevere’ in the Merriam-
Webster Dictionary : “To persist in a state, enterprise, or undertaking in spite of
counterinfluences, opposition, or discouragement.” 1 his kind of endurance is consistent
with all the cases of courage that Socrates mentions earlier in the dialogue:
...because I wanted to learn from you not only what constitutes courage for
a hoplite but for a horseman as well and for every sort of warrior. And I
wanted to include not only those who are courageous in warfare but also
those who are brave in dangers at sea, and the ones who show courage in
illness and poverty and affairs of state; and then again I wanted to include
not only those who are brave in the face of pain and fear but also those
who are clever at fighting desire and pleasure, whether by standing their
ground or running away... (1 91 d-e)
All of these cases seem to fit the kind of endurance that I have described. In all of these
cases, the agent perseveres “in spite of counterinfluences, opposition, or
discouragement.” Those who act courageously in war, at sea, or with disease do so in
spite of their fear of death or injury. Those who act courageously in poverty do so in
spite of their discouragement from lack of opportunity and financial stability. Those
acting courageously in politics do so in spite of opposition from political rivals or lobby
groups. Finally, there are those who act courageously in spite of the temptations of
desires and pleasures. For an agent to endure then, it need not be the case that he
overcomes fear in performing an action. If this is right, then we can formulate Plato's
first necessary condition for an action’s being courageous as the following:
NCI. For any action, a, and any agent performing a, x, a is courageous
only if x performs a in spite of some counterinfluences, opposition, or
discouragement.
14
Again, according to Plato, endurance is necessary but not sufficient for an action’s being
courageous. According to Plato, there seems to be some type of wisdom or knowledge
that is also necessary.
3.3: Wisdom as Necessary for an Action’s Being Courageous
After Socrates refutes the idea that endurance is sufficient for courage, he gets
Laches to accept that ‘wise endurance’ is the correct definition of ‘courage’ (192d).
However, soon after, Socrates presses Laches to explain what kind of knowledge he is
talking about. Socrates says the following. “Let us see then in what respect it is wise—is
it so with respect to everything both great and small? For instance, if a man were to show
endurance in spending his money wisely, knowing that by spending it he would get more,
would you call this man courageous” (192e)? Socrates goes on to present another
counter-example showing a man who has knowledge while enduring to perform an action
and is not courageous. 1
1
He then presents other cases that show that a man with less
knowledge exhibits more courage than a man with more knowledge when both perform
the same action.
12
But do all of these counter-examples show that, according to Plato,
knowledge is not a necessary condition for courage? I think the answer is ‘no.' What
11
“Well, suppose a man is a doctor, and his son or some other patient is ill with inflammation of the lungs
and begs him for something to eat or drink, and the man doesn’t give in but perseveres in refusing'
-
(192e-
193a)?
12
“Well, suppose a man endures in battle, and his willingness to fight is based on wise calculation because
he knows that others are coming to his aid and that he will be fighting men who are fewer than those on his
side, and inferior to them, and in addition his position is stronger: would you say that this man, with his
kind of wisdom and preparation, endures more courageously or a man in the opposite camp who is willing
to remain and hold out” (193a)? “And you would say that the man who shows endurance in a cavalry
attack and has knowledge of horsemanship is less courageous than the man who lacks this knowledge
(193b). “And the one who endures with knowledge of slinging or archery or some other art is the less
courageous” (193b). “And as many would be willing to endure in diving down into wells without being
skilled, or to endure in any other similar situation, you say are braver than those who are skilled
in these
things” (193c).
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these counter-examples show is that a specific type of knowledge, namely technical
knowledge, is not necessary for courage. In Socratic Studies . Gregory Vlastos makes this
point. He writes:
...we can see that none of the goods exemplified in the six counter-
examples—financial gain, physical health, military success, adeptness in
diving into wells, or in peltastry, or fighting on horseback—would count
as “great”: none of them involves the enhancement of the agent’s virtue;
none of them is a moral good. So we can see that by “knowledge
concerning great things” Socrates understands only what we would reckon
moral knowledge in pointed contrast to the technical knowledge possessed
by the people exemplified in each of the six cases he mentions. (112)
That Plato sees moral knowledge as a necessary component of courage is further
supported by Socrates discussion of Nicks’ proposed definition of ‘courage.’ Nicias
offers that courage is “the knowledge of the fearful and hopeful in war and in every other
situation” (195a). Socrates points out that this amounts to courage being the knowledge
of good and evil (199d). And while this definition presents somewhat of a problem for
Socrates since he thinks that this is the definition for virtue, of which courage is only a
part, the idea the knowledge of good and evil is a necessary condition for courage is not
ruled out. But what exactly is meant by “moral knowledge” or “the knowledge of good
and evil?” In “The Socratic Conception of Courage,” W. Thomas Schmid expands on
Vlastos’ interpretation. He writes, “Courage must be rooted in the intellectual perception
of the true values, and it implies therefore ‘an understanding of the comparative moral
worth of objects for which risks ought or ought not to be taken’ (Vlastos)” (118). So it
looks as though Socrates is talking about axiological knowledge, or more specifically, the
knowledge of moral worth or value. And presumably, the moral worth of an action will
be determined by weighing the value of the good to be achieved against the value of the
evil of the risks. So perhaps according to Plato, one’s action is courageous only if he
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knows that the good to be achieved makes it worth performing the action in spite of the
evil or risks associated with it. Assuming this is right, we can present a second necessary
condition for an action’s being courageous according to Plato:
NC2. For any action, a
,
and any agent performing a
,
x, a is courageous
only if x knows that the good to be achieved makes it worth performing a
in spite of the risks associated with a.
3.4: Wise Endurance as Necessary and Sufficient for an Action’s Being Courageous
I think that these two conditions that I have discussed above form a complete
account of a courageous action according to Plato. Again, it is true that Plato rejects each
of these conditions as a true definition for ‘courage,’ but this is only to show that neither
of them by itself is sufficient for courage. Although perhaps Plato believes that, if taken
jointly, these conditions are both necessary and sufficient for an action’s being
courageous. Schmid comes to this same conclusion. He writes:
But it has also been argued by most commentators that courage cannot
only be understood in terms of an intellectual stance, but that it also
requires a quality like endurance or self-control, and that Plato
acknowledges this in the Laches. It is easy to understand why he would:
for courage seems not only to involve having good critical sense, integrity,
and idealistic or noble values, so that the person is willing to risk harm for
the sake of genuinely worthwhile ends, but it also seems to involve the
capacity to control immediate disruptions of fear or over-confidence, and
to persevere when faced with long-term adversity or suffering, or repeated
exposure to danger. Courage on this complete account, then, is (a) the
power of self-mastery or endurance of the soul, as emphasized in the
discussion with Laches, guided by (b) the moral knowledge of what is
truly good and evil, as brought out in the discussion with Nicias. (118)
Perhaps the following, then, is Plato’s complete account of a courageous action. We'll
call it the “Platonic Account of a Courageous Action” or “PACA”:
PACA: For any action, a, and any agent performing a, x, a is courageous
if, and only if, (1) x performs a in spite of some counterinfluences.
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opposition, or discouragement and (2) x knows that the good to be
achieved makes it worth performing a in spite of the risks associated with
a.
Before we begin our evaluation of PACA, I think it necessary to digress a
moment to discuss the difference between ‘worth performing’ and ‘morally right.’ I want
to state clearly that I believe that when we say that an action is (morally) worth
performing, we mean something different from its being morally right. The former is a
claim in axiology (value of good and evil) while the latter is a claim in normative ethics
proper (moral rightness or wrongness). Thus, the intensions of ‘worth performing’ and
‘morally right’ are different. And so, the fact that one believes that his action is worth
performing does not entail that he believes that it is morally right. Now I'm inclined to
think that if an action is worth performing, it is morally right. Let’s assume this is true.
But what about the converse? Are ‘worth performing’ and ‘morally right’ co-
extensional? One might argue that they are co-extensional in the following way. “Look,
an action is morally right just in case it is worth performing. All that we mean by ‘the
action’s being worth performing’ is that the agent has good reason or justification for
performing the action. And the agent has good reason or justification for performing his
action if, and only if, it is morally right.” While I am inclined to agree that an action's
being morally right gives the agent good reason or justification to perlorm his action, I
think this line of argument confuses the intension of ‘worth performing.’ And 1 don't
think that Plato uses ‘worth performing’ in this way. However, it still might be the case
that ‘worth performing’ (in the axiological sense) is co-extensional with ‘morally right.
The following, at least, seems plausible. Perhaps an action's being morally right will
constitute an increase in the value of an action since it will contribute to the good to be
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achieved (because the agent is doing something morally right). But is the good to be
achieved in doing the morally right thing of such a value that it will always outweigh the
evil of the risks involved? I’m not sure about this. Consider a case like the following.
While it’s morally right for a police officer to risk his life to save an ungrateful murderer
(because it s his duty), I think it is very questionable whether his action is worth
performing. We can make the case even more convincing by supposing that the police
officer runs a very high risk of being killed while the chances that he will save the
murderer are not very good. And the police officer has a very lovely family who depend
on him for financial and emotional support. Furthermore, the murderer does not want to
be saved. And if he is saved, he will continue to commit heinous crimes. I think that
cases like this show that an action’s being morally right does not entail that it is worth
performing. Of course some theories of moral rightness will want to say that the police
officer’s action is not morally right. While I think that these theories are wrong, 1 am
satisfied with merely proving that ‘worth performing’ and ‘morally right' are not co-
intensional. And so PACA’s requirement that an agent believe that his action is worth
performing is different from the requirement that an agent believe that his action is
morally right.
Is PACA plausible? Let’s consider an action that meets the necessary and
sufficient conditions for being courageous according to PACA. Jim is a die-hard Red
Sox fan and has never missed an opening day game at Fenway in his 43 years of
existence. And often times Jim’s fanaticism gets in the way of his responsibilities. As he
drives to the ball park for this year’s game, Jim comes upon a lady who is about eight
months pregnant and whose car is broken down on the side of the road. As it turns out.
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Jim is already running about one hour late and he knows that if he stops to help this lady,
he will miss the game. And Jim really wants to go to the game. His desire to go to the
game is so strong that Jim nearly passes her by. At the last second though, he is
overcome with guilt and pulls over. Although Jim is discouraged by the thought of
missing his first opening day game, he knows that the good of helping this pregnant lady
is certainly worth it the risk of missing the ball game. Because of this, he knows that his
action is worth performing. He also knows that it is the morally right thing to do.
Now ifPACA is true, then Jim’s action is courageous. Jim performs his action in
spite of his strong desire to keep driving and go to the game. And he is certainly
discouraged that he will miss his first opening day game. It’s also the case that Jim
knows that his helping this pregnant woman makes his action worth doing in spite of the
risks. But Jim’s action is obviously not courageous. It is good that Jim does pull over to
help and it is certainly the morally right thing to do. But his action is not courageous.
Perhaps this is because the opposition or discouragement that one faces must be more
substantial than the desire to avoid missing a baseball game. Whatever the reason, we
know that Jim’s action is not courageous, and therefore, PACA is false.
But even if we look at cases where the opposition is more substantial, there also
seems to be a problem with NC2. The epistemic requirement that an agent know that the
good to be achieved makes his action worth performing in spite of the risks seems to be a
condition that many courageous acts do not meet. It seems to me that tor NC2 to obtain,
it will have to be the case that the agent knows the comparative value of good vs. evil
such that he is able to determine whether the good to be achieved is worth the risk. So
it’s not enough that he knows that the possible consequences of his action are good and
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the risk is evil. It must be the case that he knows that the possible consequences are so
good that they outweigh the evil ol his risk. But how good do the consequences have to
be in order to outweigh a given amount of evil? This is a very difficult question to
answer, and I think it is likely that many agents do not know this information regarding
their courageous actions. Perhaps some agents know this regarding their actions. Jim.
although his action is not courageous, knows that the good to be achieved is worth the
risk. But this is because the good to be achieved is substantial while the evil of his risk is
very negligible, if it’s evil at all. But frequently, the risks involved in performing
courageous actions are so great that it’s difficult to know whether or not the good to be
achieved is substantial enough to warrant the risk. Let’s take another look at the
Benavidez case. Does Benavidez know that saving his teammates is worth the risk?
Presumably, he knows that it will be good if he does this. And he knows that his risks are
evil. But I don't think we can say that he knows that the good to be achieved is of such a
value that it warrants the risks. How does one go about comparing the value of saving
lives vs. the value of losing his own or others dying?
Here’s another courageous action that illustrates the problem ofNC2. Gene
Prock died while trying to rescue a 77-year-old drowning victim from a lake. The
following excerpt was taken from the “Carnegie Hero Fund Commission" website:
Gene D. Prock died attempting to help save Pearl L. Toner from
drowning, Laurie, Missouri, April 27, 1989. Mrs. Toner, 77. was found
floating face down in a cove of Lake of the Ozarks by a retired neighbor.
Prock, 68. Prock, who had undergone surgery two weeks earlier, alerted
his wife, then obtained life jackets and ran out onto a dock near Mrs.
Toner. After Prock’s wife swam to Mrs. Toner and took her toward the
dock, Prock dived into the water and surfaced near his wife, who then
pushed Mrs. Toner toward him. After putting Mrs. Toner's head and arms
onto one of the life jackets, Prock suddenly slipped beneath the surface of
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the water. Arriving neighbors removed Mrs. Toner and Prock from the
water, but resuscitation attempts on both were unsuccessful.
Prock was aware of the dangers of his action given his advanced age and the fact that he
had just undergone surgery two weeks earlier. It’s also likely that he knew that saving
this woman’s life would be good, and that the possibility that he and his wife would die
would be evil. However, like Benavidez, I don’t think that we can say that Prock knew
the comparative value of this good vs. these evils. He just believed that it was the
morally right thing to do. Perhaps Benavidez and Prock believed that their actions were
worth performing, but they certainly did not know this. In spite of Benavidez’s and
Prock’ s lack of the relevant knowledge, their actions are courageous. If I am right, then
PACA is false.
The shortcomings ofPACA are not limited to the fact that it disqualifies paradigm
courageous actions from being courageous. It also seems to allow that some paradigm
non-courageous actions are courageous. What I mean is this. I think there are possible
cases where the necessary and sufficient conditions for PACA obtain, but the actions tail
to be courageous. This would suggest that PACA is not only too restrictive, but it also
lacks some essential elements for an action’s being courageous. Consider the following
case. Captain Foster is having a problem getting one soldier in his company. Private
Skittish, to stand his ground in combat. In their past two battles. Skittish has retreated
prior to receiving any order to do so. After receiving another mission from higher
command to set up a defense, Foster comes up with an idea. To ensure that Skittish will
fight “courageously,” Foster decides that he will have a large trench dug behind
Skittish's
fighting position .
13
This trench will prevent Skittish from retreating. No matter how
13 The idea for this case is borrowed from Wallace (78).
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fearful Skittish becomes, he will have no choice but to continue fighting. The day before
the battle, Foster has the trench dug and briefs Skittish on this development. That night,
God reveals to Skittish in a dream that the good to be achieved by his action is such that
his action is worth performing in spite of the risks and that his action is the morally right
thing to do.
14
In virtue of this revelation. Skittish knows that his action is worth
performing. During the battle the trench works just as Foster had planned. Upon seeing
a much larger and heavily armored force, Skittish becomes very fearful and would have
run away if he had had the opportunity. But because of the trench. Skittish has no choice
but to stay and fight. He does not fight for any purpose. He simply fights because he is
forced to do so. As it turns out, he inflicts massive damage on a much larger and superior
force and is extremely impressive in holding his ground. I think Skittish's case shows
that one can endure to perform an action and know that his action is worth performing,
but nevertheless fail to do something courageous. And perhaps the reason that Skittish
fails to do something courageous is that he does not want to perform his action. He does
not fight to achieve any end. He performs it merely because he has no other choice. And
had he been given the chance, he would have run away. Whatever the reason, PACA
entails that this clearly non-courageous action is courageous. Therefore, PACA lacks
some essential quality of a courageous action.
3.5: Summary
I have argued that PACA is false for the following reasons: (1) It entails that
some actions where the agent overcomes trivial opposition are courageous (Jim). (2)
Because of its stringent requirement that an agent know that his action is worth
14
This idea is borrowed from Feldman.
23
performing, it disqualifies some paradigm courageous actions from being courageous
(Benavidez and Prock). (3) Finally, there are some actions that are clearly not
courageous in spite of their meeting the necessary and sufficient conditions for PACA
(Skittish). Based on these arguments, we can make the following preliminary
conclusions regarding courage: (1) It is likely that endurance is necessary for courage,
but it seems that it will have to be endurance against something more substantial than
trivial desires or fears. (2) It is not necessary for courage that an agent know that his
action is worth performing. Of course, it might still turn out that it is necessary that an
agent believe that his action is worth performing. We’ll explore this possibility in the
next section. (3) Finally, it seems likely that a courageous action must be one in which
the agent is not forced to perform his action. The agent must desire to perform his action.
Or he must perform his action to achieve some end. His action must be purposeful.
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CHAPTER 4
JAMES WALLACE’S ACCOUNT OF A COURAGEOUS ACTION
4.1: Introduction
James Wallace’s account of a courageous action, hereafter “JWACA”, is a bit
more sophisticated than PACA, but both stress the importance of the agent's reasoning in
courageous actions. Wallace argues that “courage is concerned with practical reasoning
in the face of danger and acting upon the results of that reasoning. ..”(81). However,
while PACA requires that the agent know that his action is worth performing in order for
it to be courageous, JWACA eases this requirement to belief. Another commonality
between these two accounts is that neither requires that the agent feel fear in performing
his action. Each requires only that the agent face some danger or opposition. And while
Plato is somewhat vague on what types of opposition or danger will suffice, Wallace
attempts to formalize this criterion. Finally, Wallace also introduces the idea that a
courageous action must be one in which the agent believes that it is possible for him to do
otherwise. But while Wallace’s changes and additions identify and address the major
shortcomings of PACA, he runs into problems of his own with the introduction of belief.
4.2: The Account
I’ll begin by presenting and explaining JWACA and will then offer my
assessment. Here’s the account:
JWACA: For any action, a, and any agent, x, a is courageous if, and only if, (1) x
believes that it is dangerous for him to do a, (2) x believes that his doing a is
worth the risks it involves, (3) x believes that it is possible for him not to do a, (4)
the danger x sees in doing a must be sufficiently formidable that
most people
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would find it difficult in the circumstances to do a
,
and (5) x is not coerced into
doing a by threats of punishment, which he fears more than he fears the dangers
of doing a. (78-81)
Beginning with NCI, Wallace states that by ‘danger’ he means “anything that threatens
[the agent’s] well-being” (78). So although this danger may certainly be physical, it also
allows that this danger be one of “economic loss, loss of prestige, ostracism, or censure”
(78). Prima facie, this condition might seem similar to PACA’s, that an agent must
endure through some counterinfluence, opposition, or discouragement. But JWACA’s
condition is different in at least two respects. First, according to JWACA, this
opposition, or danger, is relevant to courage only if it is a threat to the agent’s well-being.
Second, the agent must believe that this danger is a threat to his well-being. 15 Wallace’s
justification for NC2 is that were NCI to obtain without NC2, it would be more
appropriate to call the action “foolish or reckless” (78). This seems plausible, but how
are we supposed to understand this condition? It appears to be similar to the condition of
PACA that the agent know that his action is worth performing in spite of the risks. Like
Plato, Wallace seems to define an action’s worth in terms of a comparison between the
value of the good to be achieved and the risks involved. Wallace writes, “Every
courageous act must have some aim or end that the agent has reason to regard as
important or worthwhile” (76). But unlike PACA, JWACA requires only that the agent
believe that his action is worth performing.
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Regarding NC3, Wallace writes, “[NC3]
requires that [the agent] think that he has some choice in the matter. When an army is
aware that deep trenches have been dug behind them so that they cannot retreat, then they
15 Of course NC2 requires only that the agent believe that his action is dangerous (threatens his well-being).
This alone would allow actions that are not really dangerous. However, as we will see, NC4 entails that the
action must be dangerous.
16
Similar to Plato, I take it that Wallace uses ‘worth’ in the axiological sense.
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are not being courageous when they stand their ground under attack” (78). So this
condition will disqualify actions like Skittish’s from being courageous. NC4 prevents
JWACA from being vulnerable to the objection brought against PACA by Jim’s (die-hard
Red Sox Fan) action. Wallace writes,
“Where the danger is slight and the reward substantial, doing [the action)
will not necessarily be courageous. There is danger involved in
automobile travel, but people are not being courageous when they drive
their cars. This suggests that the danger involved must be great enough so
that it is difficult to do the act in question—not necessarily difficult for the
agent, but at least difficult for most people.” (78-9)
Presumably, then, while Jim’s reward or end is substantial (helping the pregnant woman),
his danger (missing the Red Sox game) is too slight to allow his action to be courageous
since most people would not find it difficult in the circumstances to perform Jim’s action.
Finally, NC5 requires that an agent not be coerced into performing his action by threats
of punishment that he fears more than the dangers of the action itself. Wallace seems to
get this idea from Aristotle. The following text clarifies his point:
Aristotle remarks that soldiers who go into battle because they are
threatened with terrible punishments if they refuse show an inferior kind
of courage. “One ought to be brave not under compulsion but because it is
noble to be so” (111 6b2-2). These are cases in which a person faces
danger because his only alternative is to face a different danger that he
fears more. Now if a soldier’s fear of fighting is excessive to begin with,
so that he will not fight unless he is forced to do so, it is not surprising that
his fighting under compulsion is not regarded as courageous. (80)
So if the end of an agent’s action is to avoid threats of punishment that he fears more than
the dangers of the action itself, then his action is not courageous. Now that we have a
better understanding of JWACA, we can move on to evaluating it.
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4.3: Evaluation of the Account
Consider the following case. Dan is frequently motivated to act by his genuine
concern for others. One day, while walking home from work, Dan notices a small child
and his mother crossing the street at the crosswalk. The child has a lollipop in his mouth
and couldn’t be any happier. This makes Dan smile. As the child and his mother are
about to make it across, the child drops his lollipop in the street. Just then, the “Don’t
Walk” signal pops up and traffic resumes moving. The child lunges back to retrieve his
lollipop but is quickly reined in by his mother onto the sidewalk. Dan sees that the child
is visibly upset. Dan really wishes that the child could go back to being happy with his
lollipop. Two cars have passed now, and each has barely missed running over the
lollipop. The child is still inconsolable. Dan thinks about running out to retrieve the
lollipop. He knows that this action will be very dangerous for him, but he believes that
making the child happy again is worth this risk and he thinks that it is the morally right
thing to do. Dan also knows that he does not have to perform this action. After his brief
deliberation, Dan runs out and retrieves the lollipop. He barely avoids being hit by a
semi-truck. Now it seems clear that Dan’s action meets all of the necessary and sufficient
conditions for JWACA. He believes that it is dangerous for him to retrieve the lollipop.
He believes that retrieving the lollipop is worth the risk of getting hit by a car. He
believes that is it possible not to retrieve the lollipop. The danger that Dan sees in
retrieving the lollipop is sufficiently formidable that most people would find it difficult in
the circumstances to do it. And finally, Dan is not coerced into retrieving the lollipop by
threats of punishment that he fears more than getting hit by a car. So according to
JWACA, Dan’s action is courageous. But Dan’s action is clearly not courageous. It
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would seem more appropriate to say that it is reckless, foolhardy, or misguided. And
perhaps the reason that his action is not courageous is that it is not worth the risk or that it
is not the morally right thing to do. It’s true that Dan believes that his action is worth the
risk and that it is the morally right thing to do, but most of us can see that it is neither of
these. And perhaps because of this, we know that his action is not courageous. So
because JWACA entails that Dan’s action is courageous, this account of a courageous
action is false.
While Dan’s action shows that mere belief that an action is worth the risk is not
sufficient for its being courageous, I think there are other cases that show that this is not
even necessary. That is, I think it is possible for an agent not to believe that his action is
worth the risk and still act courageously. Consider this case. Ron is a fireman
responding with his company to a burning apartment building. When Ron arrives at the
scene, he sees that the situation is very desperate. The fire has spread throughout all six
floors of the building and it is apparent that people are trapped inside. As Ron
approaches the second floor of the building, he hears screaming coming from the
apartment to his immediate right. He immediately recognizes this apartment as being the
site of a suspected methamphetamine (meth) lab. Ron comes to believe that the people
screaming inside are meth dealers and that they are responsible for the fire. He touches
the door immediately in front of him and notices that it is extremely hot. Ron believes
that if he enters the apartment through this door, there is a good chance that he will be
severely injured or killed. However, Ron also believes that this is the only entrance to the
apartment and that in order to save these lives, he'll have to enter this door. Just prior to
entering the door, Ron thinks to himself, “Damn! I’m a good person and I'm about to
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risk my life for a bunch of no-good meth dealers. Not to mention, these are the people
who started this fire in the first place. My life is not worth risking for these people. But
you know what? 1 am a firefighter and it’s my job to save them.” Ron is killed by the
severe flames as he tries to enter the door. Now because Ron does not believe that his
action is worth performing, JWACA entails that his action is not courageous. But I think
this is clearly wrong. Recall that Wallace’s motivation for introducing NC2 was to
prevent actions that are foolish or reckless from being courageous. But I think that
Wallace would certainly agree that Ron’s action is neither foolish nor reckless. And
perhaps this is because Ron’s action is the morally right thing to do, even though it does
not seem to be worth the risk. And that it is Ron’s duty to perform his action, that he is
not forced to perform it, and that he faces extreme danger certainly seem to merit his
action being called ‘courageous.’ If this is right, then JWACA is false. It is false because
belief that one’s action is worth performing is not necessary for its being courageous.
Here’s another counterexample to JWACA. Let’s suppose that Private Skittish
has a fellow soldier in his foxhole, Private Stanton. As it turns out, Stanton also has a
dream in which God reveals to him that fighting against this much larger and superior
enemy force is worth performing and that it is the morally right thing to do. In virtue of
this, Stanton knows that his action is worth performing. Stanton also knows about the
trench that has been dug behind their foxhole. So it’s not the case that he believes that it
is possible for him not to perform his action. Unlike Skittish though, Stanton performs
his action because he wants to do his duty. His action is purposeful. And had the trench
not been there, Stanton would still have stood his ground. Furthermore, Stanton, based
on good evidence, believes that it is dangerous for him to perform his action. And his
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action is sufficiently formidable that most people would find it difficult to perform it. It’s
also the case that Stanton is not coerced into performing his action by threats of
punishment that he fears more than his action. So like Skittish’s action, Stanton’s meets
all of the necessary and sufficient conditions ofJWACA except for NC3. Neither of
these men believes that it is possible for him not to fight. So according to JWACA,
neither of these actions is courageous. But I think that Stanton’s action is courageous
even though he does not believe that it is possible for him not to perform it. And I think
that his action is courageous because although he has no choice but to fight, his action is
purposeful. Although he has no choice but to perform his action, he is willing to perform
it. He fights because he wants to do his duty. And had the trench not been there, Stanton
would still have stood his ground. Because of this, Stanton’s action is courageous and
Skittish’s is not. If I am right, then JWACA is false.
Now let’s take a closer look at NC4. NC4 seems to be helpful in preventing
actions like Jim’s from being courageous, I think it presents other problems for JWACA.
By requiring that the danger the agent sees in performing his action be sufficiently
formidable that most people would have difficulty in the circumstances performing the
action, JWACA is too restrictive. Walton presents the following counterexample to NC4:
Rachman (1978:244 f.) reviews the case of a middle-aged woman who had
strong irrational fears of disease, germs, and dirt. She had become so
frightened of possible contamination that she came to avoid contact with
other people altogether, spending her days in one sequestered room of hei
house in a chair she scrubbed down with disinfectant several times each
day. After much discussion and internal struggle, she chose the treatment
option of “flooding”—a rapid and uncomfortable method of exposing the
patient directly to the feared stimulus repeatedly—to slower but
more
comfortable methods. The first few sessions were particularly difficult for
her. She was very frightened, and experienced obvious adverse
reactions
to the program of increasing contact with dirty objects and
situations.
Despite the severe emotional toll of these sessions, she persisted
with the
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program to the end. Rachman (ibid., p. 245) comments that in his opinion
she “displayed commendable courage,” comparable in his experience to
the courage shown by professional boxers, combat troops, and firemen.
(VI )
17
Shortly after, Walton says this. “It is hard to deny the claim that this woman acted
courageously, but clearly [NC4] is not met. For it would be quite false to assert that the
danger she saw in carrying out her treatment was sufficiently formidable that most people
would find it difficult in the circumstances to do what she did” (71).
18
I think that this is
a decisive objection against JWACA, specifically NC4. Although this woman's action is
not one that most people in the circumstances would find difficult, it is nevertheless
difficult for her. It is difficult for her because performing it is a real threat to her well-
being. In fact, performing this action takes a severe emotional toll on her. So her action
is nonetheless courageous even though most people would not find it difficult.
1 ’ And if
it’s right that her action is courageous, then JWACA is false.
17
Philippa Foot, in Virtues and Vices and other Essays in Moral Philosophy , presents a similar example.
“On the other hand even irrational fears may give an occasion for courage: if someone suffers from
claustrophobia or a dread of heights he may require courage to do that which would not be a courageous
action for others” (12).
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It’s likely that Wallace would respond to this counterexample by saying that most people would find this
woman’s action difficult if they were in her circumstances, to include having her irrational fear of disease,
germs, and dirt. But Walton makes this additional point. “Much depends here on what is meant precisely
by ‘in the circumstances’ in [NC4]. Another person precisely like this [woman] would presumably feel the
same degree of formidable danger. So if the ‘most people’ in [NC4] ‘in the circumstances’ are supposed to
be exactly like this particular person in all respects , then they too would feel the danger sufficiently
formidable.’ But I take it that is not what [NC4] requires, or should require. What [NC4] seems to mean is
that the danger must be thought sufficiently formidable by the broad majority of people, many of
whom
may be quite unlike the courageous individual in question” (72). 1 think this is the correct
interpretation of
NC4. Wallace seems to suggest this in the following text. “Sometimes, however, when a
person faces a
danger of which he is terribly afraid, but that other people would not find formidable, we
do see courage
involved in his act even though [NC4] is not satisfied. He shows ability to master great tear,
which is one
of the capacities involved in courage, but his fear of the situation is excessive...
One might say in such a
case that doing [his action] is bravefor the agent, but it would not be correct to
say unqualifiedly that his
doing [his action] is courageous” (79).
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This is to be distinguished from Jim’s difficulty in performing his
action. The difficulty for Jim in
performing his action stems from his discouragement at the thought of
missing the ball game. But this is
not a real danger for Jim since it is not a threat to his well-being.
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The previous objections focus on problems with existing necessary conditions of
JWACA. But I think there is at least one other necessary condition for a courageous
action that Wallace fails to consider. 20 Let’s consider the case of another firefighter,
Randy, who is in similar circumstances to Ron. When Randy arrives at the second floor,
he notices that there are two doors into the apartment. Unlike Ron, Randy does not
recognize the apartment as the site of a suspected meth lab. He believes that there are
good people inside that need to be saved. Randy knows that in order to save the people
inside he will have to enter the apartment through one of the two doors. He touches each
of the doors and finds that one (door 1) is very hot while the other (door 2) is somewhat
cooler, although still hot. Based on this quick assessment, Randy believes that entering
door 1 is more dangerous than entering door 2. He also believes that both of these doors
are equally effective ways to get into the apartment. Furthermore, Randy believes that
saving these people far outweighs the danger of entering either door. He decides to enter
door 1 and is killed by the violent flames. Now I think that Randy’s action, in spite of the
fact that he believes that it is dangerous and worth the risk, is not courageous. It seems
that entering door 2 would be the prudent and courageous thing to do for Randy. The
situation would be very different if he believed that door 1 was the only available
entrance into the apartment. In this case, Randy would not believe that there was an
equally effective and less dangerous option available to him. However, given that he
believes that there is a less dangerous and equally effective way into the apartment, his
entering door 1 does not seem courageous. It seems to be a case where one
willingly
20
This idea is taken from a necessary condition put forth by Walton.
However, in evaluating Wallace s
account of a courageous action, Walton does not point out this
deficiency of JWACA.
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takes an unnecessary risk. Perhaps his action is daring, but I do not think that it is
courageous.
Finally, I think that NC5 is a plausible necessary condition for a courageous
action. I think that the following case supports this condition. Suppose that there is a
third soldier in Captain Foster’s company, Private Smithers. Smithers has the same
revelation as Skittish and Stanton and so he knows that his action is worth performing
and that it is the morally right thing to do. However, Smithers is in a different foxhole,
which does not have a trench behind it. Unlike Skittish, Smithers is not a big risk to flee,
but Foster still has some concern regarding Smithers’ performance on the battlefield. So
instead of the trench, Foster warns Smithers that he will proceed with a court-martial if
Smithers retreats. Now while Smithers is afraid of standing his ground, he is more afraid
of being court-martialed. And so Smithers chooses to stand his ground to avoid being
court-martialed. And as it turns out, Smithers performs very impressively. However, had
there been no threat of a court-martial, Smithers would have fled. Now 1 think it is clear
that Smithers’ action is not courageous. It is not courageous because even though
Smithers chooses to stand his ground, he does this for an unsatisfactory end. He does
it
to avoid punishment. But why is the avoidance of punishment an unsatisfactory end
tor a
courageous action? We’ll explore this question more in chapter six.
4.4: Summary
I have argued that JWACA is false since NC2 entails that some reckless actions
are courageous (Dan) and NCs2-4 disqualify some paradigm
courageous actions (Ron,
Stanton, and germ phobic woman). JWACA also seems to lack a further
necessary
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condition for a courageous action since it allows that actions where the agent takes what
he perceives to be unnecessary risk are courageous (Randy). Finally, NC5 looks to be a
plausible necessary condition for a courageous action especially when we consider
actions like Smithers’. These arguments seem to suggest the following regarding
courageous actions: (1) It still looks as though the agent’s believing that he is facing
some formidable danger is necessary for an action’s being courageous. However, this
danger need not be one that most people would find formidable. Perhaps it would be
better to require that the agent has good reason to think that his action threatens his well-
being. (2) Perhaps it is not necessary for an action’s being courageous that it be worth
the risk. We already know that knowing this is not required, but it also seems that
believing this is not required. Perhaps an action’s being courageous is more closely tied
to its being morally right, rather than its being worth the risk. (3) Also, it doesn't seem
necessary for a courageous action that the action be one in which the agent believes that it
possible for him not to perform it. It does seem necessary, though, that the agent
performs his action willingly. He must do it to achieve some end. (4) Furthermore, it
looks as if this end will need to be one other than the avoidance of punishment. (5)
Finally, it looks as though a courageous action must be one in which the agent does not
believe that there is an equally effective and less dangerous option available to him. W e
need to know that the agent did not take a perceived needless risk in performing his
action in order to call it ‘courageous.’ We need to know that the risk he assumed was one
that he believed to be necessary. Perhaps an action’s being morally right
will take care of
this requirement.
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CHAPTER 5
DOUGLAS WALTON’S ACCOUNT OF A COURAGEOUS ACTION
5.1: Introduction
Douglas Walton presents an account of a courageous action, hereafter
“DWACA”, equally as sophisticated as JWACA. And like Plato and Wallace, Walton
recognizes that fear is not essential for a courageous action. He explains, “A courageous
act is one in which, based on the good intentions of the agent in attempting to realize a
worthy goal, he or she overcomes great danger or difficulty—whether afraid or not" (14).
DWACA is also similar to JWACA in that it stresses the importance of practical
reasoning. Walton writes, “Courage is the use of practical reasoning to remove any
obstacle that prevents a person from carrying out good intentions that are possible and
appropriate in a particular situation” (94). And while this strikes a similar chord to that
of JWACA, Walton, recognizing that belief is not sufficient, introduces the idea that
“justified belief’ is necessary for an action’s being courageous. He writes the following:
Here, then, is a crucial difference between my own approach and that ot
Wallace. For Wallace, mere belief is enough. My own account ot
courage will require that the agent justifiably believes that his act is
dangerous yet will have good results or benefits. Otherwise, in my view,
the act need not be truly courageous. It is a matter of how the agent sees
the situation, what his intentions are, and how he carries out these
intentions in the particular circumstances by practical reasoning. (87)
So Walton recognizes that Wallace’s account of a courageous action
cannot be right since
Wallace’s use of “mere belief’ is not enough “to bar certain types
of irrational or ill-
considered acts which would not be considered courageous" (68).
And he thinks that his
own account, with the introduction of “justified belief’,
is a better account since it does
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not allow actions of this type to be courageous. Walton argues that this is because
courage is “essentially a normative concept” (133). And so the definitions of Wallace
and others, who relate “courage to purely psychological factors of belief’, are insufficient
since “they lack normative force” (74).
21 The implication, then, is that DWACA, in
requiring justified rather than mere belief, will identify only those actions that have real
moral value as courageous. In order to better understand and evaluate this claim, we’ll
need to know what Walton means by “justified belief.” This matter will be settled in the
following explanation of DWACA. For sake of accuracy. I’ll present Walton’s account
exactly as he does in the text. However, since his formulation is somewhat confusing. I’ll
present a simplified version ofDWACA after an explanation of his text.
5.2: The Account
DWACA consists of two parts, the “practical reasoning base” and the “ethical
matrix” (86).
22 The practical reasoning base requires “certain circumstances of the act"
and that the agent “perceives the circumstances” in a reasonable manner (86). The
21 One might wonder at this point what Walton means by “normative.” He says this later. “I mean
‘normative’ in the sense of the agent’s personal—but reasonable—standards of virtue in relation to his
position. I do not mean ‘normative’ in the sense referring to duties that apply to all moral agents as such
(95). Although it’s unclear what Walton means to be saying here, he seems to be
drawing a distinction
between ‘normative’ in some subjective, but reasonable, sense and ‘normative in the more
traditional
sense (i.e. what is morally right, wrong, permissible, obligatory, etc.).
22 Regarding the division of his account into two sections, Walton says this. “The danger
or difficulty of the
act and the worth of the outcome together constitute the ethical matrix of the
definition; the sequence ol
actions and outcomes is called the practical reasoning base. If we drop the
part about the worth ot the
outcome and define ‘difficulty’ or ‘danger’ nonnormatively, we get a
nonnormative alternative account,
which 1 argue corresponds more correctly to ‘bravery’ rather than ‘courage’.
Courage, 1 have argued in
support of Aristotle, is essentially a normative concept. I have also
argued, however that it is imPortant
,
theory, to be able to separate the practical reasoning base and the
ethical matrix (133). Walton thinks that
this separation is important since it allows his definition to
“divide” rather than “beg the question o
whether courage is a good quality...” (90). These remarks are puzzling
since it s not clear exactly what
Walton means by “dividing” the question. Furthermore, I don’t
see that a question is begged if one give,
arguments for including essential normative conditions in
courage. However, this distinction is not
our purposes since Walton is clear that both of these parts
are necessary for a courageous
(although not brave) action. Thus, we need to evaluate both of
them as such.
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ethical matrix is supposed to carry the “normative force” of DWACA. He presents his
account as follows:
To define the notion of a courageous action, we start with an agent a and
some descriptions of states of affairs A and B. We say that c/’s bringing
about A is a courageous action only if there exists some state of affairs B
such that the following five clauses are met. The five clauses state the
basic concept of a courageous action, and need to be supplemented by
several derivative clauses some of which define special overtones of the
basic definition and some of which define special kinds of courageous
acts. The five clauses are divided into two parts. The first part, called the
practical reasoning base, has three clauses.
(PI) In order to bring about B, a considers that it is necessary to bring
about A.
(P2) a brings about A.
(P3) a could have not brought about A. (86)
Concerning PI, Walton uses “considers” to mean “justifiably believes” (87). So PI can
be translated to read “In order to bring about B, a justifiably believes that it is necessary
to bring about A.” This condition seems to answer the objection to JWACA that an
action is imprudent or senseless if there was another action available to the agent that
required less risk. In this case, A would not be necessary for bringing about B. But
Walton’s use of “justifiable belief’ allows the possibility that one could be mistaken
regarding A’s necessity, yet still do something courageous. Walton says the following:
In so describing the agent’s judgment, mere belief was not enough, we
argued. The agent must have a justified belief that one thing is necessary
for another. However, this requirement of justified belief, as we found in
this chapter, is far from a matter of certain knowledge. It is a matter
of
reasonable argument and foresight, of taking a position that is arguably
reasonable in the present circumstances, but that could turn out
later to be
wrong. The reasonable position at the time may not turn out to be
the
position that can afterward be justified with the advantages ot
hindsight.
(130-1)
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So for PI to obtain, it is not required that A be actually necessary to bring about B. It is
required only that the agent justifiably believes this to be the case. Before we go any
further, we need to be clear on what Walton means by “justified belief.”
As we saw in the text just quoted, Walton acknowledges that one may have a
justified belief that P even though it may turn out that P is false. This much is
uncontroversial and perhaps trivial, but what it means for the belief that P to be justified
is a different matter. While there are many competing theories on this subject, we will be
concerned only with what Walton means by “justified belief.” And although Walton is
not very clear on this matter, we can make some plausible assumptions about what he
means based on what he says in the text. He says things like, “However, if these beliefs
turn out to be false but justified by the evidence available at the time, the act can still be
considered courageous” (132). And also, “The basis of such distinctions [between
courageous and foolish or careless actions] seems to turn on the question of whether the
agent’s judgment of the situation was based on a justified belief or a belief that was
reasonable on the evidence at the time, even if it turned out to be false” (132). And
lastly, that justified beliefs are those that are made “on the basis of what we may take to
be good evidence...” (132). Based on this text, I think it is fair to assume that Walton
means to say that a belief is justified if, and only if, it is a belief that a reasonable person
would typically form given the evidence available.
23 Here is a brief example. I believe
that I am typing on my keyboard at this time. I have formed this belie! based on the
following evidence: I see my fingers moving over the keyboard, I see words appearing
on the screen as I see my fingers moving, and I can feel that my fingers moving. Now
23 No doubt, a fuller explanation would be necessary in order to defend such a
theory of epistemic
justification. However, this formulation is sufficient for our purposes.
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because we would agree that a reasonable person would typically form this belief based
on the same evidence, my belief is justified by Walton’s account. And even if it turned
out that my belief was false (I’m a brain in a vat being manipulated to experience these
sensations), according to Walton’s account my belief would still be justified. However,
suppose I were to form the same belief based on the following evidence: I see my
computer in front of me, I hear what sounds like typing on the other side of the room, I
notice that my fingers are not moving, I do not see words appearing on the screen, and 1
do not feel my fingers moving. Now because my belief that I am typing is not one that a
reasonable person would typically form based on the same evidence, it is not justified.
Now let’s apply this to PI. Suppose on my way home today, I come upon a terrible
automobile accident in which a young man is trapped in a burning automobile. I am the
first person to arrive on the scene. When I approach the car, I find that there is a large
amount of gasoline leaking from the side of the car that has not yet caught fire. I also
notice that the fire is spreading quickly to that side and that the man is unconscious and
cannot remove himself from the car. After quickly surveying the evidence, 1 come to
believe that my removing this man from the car is necessary for saving his life. Given all
the evidence, it seems that according to Walton’s account, my belief that this action is
necessary for saving the man is justified. Again, this belief might be wrong. That is,
perhaps the firemen or paramedics are right behind me and they will be able to remove
the man from his car. But based on the evidence, it seems that I am justified in
believing
that my action is necessary for saving the man’s life. This is because it seems right to say
that a reasonable person would typically form this belief based on the same
evidence.
However, this same belief would be unjustified if I saw that firemen
were already on the
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scene and putting out the fire, and that another fireman was in the process of pulling the
injured man from his car. Presumably, a reasonable person would not typically form this
belief based on the same evidence. And in this case, my running over to pull the man
from his car would not be courageous since I do not justifiably believe that it is necessary
to save the man’s life. In this case, it might seem like an inappropriate or rash action.
P2 is trivial and we’ll drop it from our reformulation. Finally, P3 is similar to
JWACA in that both appeal to the idea that a courageous action must be one in which the
agent has a choice in whether or not he performs his action. Although Walton’s
condition is different from Wallace’s since his requires that it actually be the case that it
is possible for the agent not to perform his action. Recall that JWC requires only that the
agent believes that it is possible for him not to perform his action.
Next Walton presents the two conditions of the ethical matrix:
(El) a considers that B is [highly] worth a ' s bringing about.
(E2) a considers that his bringing about A is dangerous or difficult [to a
formidable extent]. (86)
24
Similar to PI, El can be translated to read “a justifiably believes that B is [highly] worth
o ' s bringing about.”
25
Let’s use our previous example to make Walton’s point. This is
the case where I come upon the accident and I justifiably believe that my removing the
man from his car is necessary for saving his life. Now saving this man s life is the end ot
my action. So according to Walton, my action will be courageous only if I justifiably
believe that saving his life is worth bringing about. This time, when I see the man, I
notice that it is my best friend’s son. I know him to be a very good kid and would hate to
24 The bracketed text for El and E2 is Walton’s. The implication seems to be that,
although not necessary
for an action’s being courageous, ends of higher worth and more formidable
dangers will cause an action to
be more courageous.
25
1 am assuming that Walton, like Plato and Wallace, uses ‘worth’ in the
axiological sense.
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see him die. Based on this evidence, I form the belief that saving this man is worth
bringing about. And it seems that my belief is justified since a reasonable person would
typically form the same belief given the same evidence.26
Following PI and El, E2 can be translated to read “a justifiably believes that his
bringing about A is dangerous or difficult [to a formidable extent].” And similar
DWACA’s previous conditions containing justified belief, E2 does not require that the
agent’s belief that his action is dangerous be true. It requires only that this belief be
reasonable based on the evidence available. Here is the type of situation that Walton has
in mind. John has visited the same beach for the last five days. And each of these days,
John has spotted several sharks in the shallow water. One day, a group of tourists arrives
at the beach, and one of them promptly jumps into the water. This worries John, so he
gets up to go tell the others who have stayed on shore about the recent shark activity.
Just as he finishes warning the others, the tourist in the water screams in pain. The
tourists on the beach do not move since they are very frightened by the possibility of
sharks. John notices that nobody is doing anything to help. He is also very concerned
about the sharks, but he realizes that he has to do something to save this man. John
jumps into the water and quickly retrieves the man. As it turns out there were no sharks
in the water and the man has simply been stung by a jellyfish. After the jellyfish victim
learns about the recent shark activity, he is quite relieved. All the tourists thank John for
his courageous action. So El allows that John’s action is courageous even though there
26
Admittedly, it’s difficult to say what type of evidence would make this belief unjustified. Perhaps we’d
have to change the situation dramatically to say that there was only a stuffed animal left in the car.
And
that the end of my action was to save the stuffed animal. I consider the following evidence: 1 see a stuffed
animal in the car, 1 believe that stuffed animals are similar in appearance to real animals and 1
believe that,
because of this, stuffed animals have similar worth to real animals. Based on this evidence, 1
form the
belief that saving this stuffed animal is worth bringing about. In this case, it seems right
to say that my
belief is unjustified.
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was no real danger in performing his action. This is because John’s belief that his action
was dangerous (because he believed there were sharks in the water) was based on
evidence that would lead a reasonable person to typically form the same belief.
There is one more important point to consider regarding DWACA and its
requirement ofjustified belief. One might be tempted to draw the conclusion that all
courageous actions, according to Walton, require a conscious or deliberate process of
practical reasoning. This seems like a reasonable conclusion since it would be difficult, if
not impossible, to form the required justified beliefs without this conscious process. And
you will recall from our previous discussion on whether fear is necessary for courage that
Walton presents a counterexample illustrating that some courageous actions are
performed where the agent does not have enough time to feel fear. But if this is right,
then one might wonder whether the agent, in cases like these, would have time to form
the required justified belief either. Walton identifies this potential problem in the
following text:
It is fair to add that not only is this sort of example a problem for von
Wright’s sort of view but it is also a difficulty for views—like my own—
that take courage to be a form of practical reasoning or cool deliberation in
a bad situation. Burr had no time tor deliberation or tear, yet his act was
courageous. (136)
Walton addresses this apparent inconsistency in the following way:
It does not matter that many deliberate actions are not undertaken with a
plan consciously preformulated in any elaborate way. For we can
still
reconstruct the action as bearing out the intention we can reasonably
take
the agent to have had. As Dray (1957:123) puts it, “there is a calculation
which could be constructed for it: the one the agent would have
gone
through if he had the time, if he had not seen what to do in a
flash, it he
had been called upon to account for what he did after the event,
etc. (172-
3 )
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So Walton is able to accommodate quick and deliberate courageous actions by appealing
to practical reasoning and justified belief in some counterfactual sense.
5,3: Evaluation of the Account
We are now ready to evaluate DWACA. But before we begin. I’ll restate it here
in a simplified version:
DWACA: For any action, a
,
any agent, x, and any end, y, a is courageous
if and only if (1) in order to bring about y, x justifiably believes that it is
necessary to bring about a, (2) x could have not brought about a, (3) x
justifiably believes that y is [highly] worth x’s bringing about, and (4) x
justifiably believes that bringing about a is dangerous or difficult [to a
formidable extent].
Let’s consider NCI . I argued in the previous chapter that actions in which the agent
takes needless risk do not seem to be courageous (Randy). Walton’s introduction ofNCI
seems to take care of this problem. Unfortunately, it has problems of its own. Let’s
suppose that another firefighter, Russ, is in a near identical situation to Randy, only when
Russ checks the doors, he finds that both of them are equally hot. He also sees that both
doors will provide equally good access to the apartment. He comes to the justified belief,
then, that entering door 1 and entering door 2 are equally dangerous and useful actions
for entering the apartment. So Russ justifiably believes that neither of these actions,
taken individually, is necessary to save the people.
28
Russ enters door 1 and is killed by
the violent flames. Now according to DWACA, Russ’ action is not courageous since he
27 Thanks to Feldman for pointing this problem out to me.
28
Perhaps one would argue that although the action of entering either of these doors is not necessary for
saving the lives, entering the apartment is. However, I think that we can change the story to
show that this
is not required either. We could say that Russ has two equally dangerous and effective options even in this
case. Perhaps he could scale a ladder and pull people through the window (without entering the
apartment).
And let’s say that he justifiably believes that this option is equally dangerous and effective as entering
the
apartment. Even in this case, Russ does not justifiably believe that either option is necessary
to save the
lives. Nevertheless, both would seem to be courageous.
44
does not justifiably believe that entering door 1 is necessary to save the people. But 1
think this is clearly false. It seems to me that Russ’ entering door 1 or door 2, even
though he justifiably believes that neither is necessary for achieving his end, would both
be courageous actions. Perhaps Russ does justifiably believe that it is necessary that he
enters door 1 or door 2, but he does not justifiably believe that either action, taken
individually, is necessary.
29 So perhaps the critical requirement for Russ’ action’s being
courageous, and not rash, is that he is does not believe that there exists an alternative
action that is less dangerous and equally effective for achieving his end.
What about NC2? I mentioned that this condition is different from JWACA since
Walton says nothing about the agent believing that it is possible for him not to perform
his action. Walton requires that it possible for him not to perform it. He says nothing
about the agent’s epistemic or doxastic state. Nevertheless, the case that I presented
against JWACA’ s condition was one in which the agent (Stanton) knows that he has no
choice but to perform his action. And of course, it follows from this that it is not the case
that it is possible for Stanton not to perform his action. Thus, it is an objection to
DWACA’s condition as well.
The case of Ron, which I presented as an objection to JWACA, is equally a
problem for DWACA’s NC3. Recall that Ron, when he arrives at the burning apartment,
notices that it is the site of a suspected meth lab. He comes to believe that the people
inside are meth dealers, who are probably responsible for the fire in the building. Based
on this, he does not believe that saving these people is worth bringing about. In fact, Ron
29
Let “jB”=“justifiably believes that”, “r”=“Russ”, “N”=“it is necessary for achieving his end that",
“a”=“Russ enters door 1”, “b”=“Russ enters door 2”. We can make the following true statements regarding
Russ’ situation: JBr[N(a v b)]; ~{JBr[N(a) v N(b)]}.
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thinks it is probably better if they die since these dealers have been responsible for
harming many people. Nevertheless, Ron believes that entering the apartment in order to
save these people is the morally right thing to do. After all, he is a firefighter and this is
his job. So Ron, fearing for his life and wanting to do the right thing, enters the
apartment and is killed while attempting to save these people. Now I think that Ron’s
action is clearly courageous. And the fact that he does not believe that these people are
worth saving does not seem to detract from this intuition. And perhaps his action is even
more courageous since he risks his life to do the morally right thing for people that he
does not believe to be worth it. If I am right, then DWACA is false.
Regarding NC4, 1 think that Walton is somewhat close to the mark. Perhaps he is
right to require that the agent justifiably believes that his situation is dangerous or
difficult. The case of John, who justifiably believes that there are sharks in the water,
seems to support NC4. This case suggests that there need not be any real danger or
difficulty present for the action to be courageous. It need only be the case that the agent
justifiably believes that there is some real danger in performing his action. However,
DWACA does not offer us an explanation of what dangers count for courage. As we saw
from our discussion of PACA, this danger will have to be something more than the
disappointment of missing out on a baseball game. Perhaps Wallace s definition ot
‘danger’ as ‘something that threatens the agent’s well-being’ will be adequate (78).
We’ll explore this in the next chapter.
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5.4: Summary
I have argued that DWACA is false since NCsl-3 are not required in some
paradigm cases of courage (Russ, Stanton, and Ron). Based on our discussion of
DWACA we can make the following preliminary conclusions: (1) It is not required for a
courageous action that the agent justifiably believes his action is necessary for achieving
his end. Perhaps it is required that he does not believe that there exists an alternative
action that is less dangerous and equally effective for achieving his end. Perhaps an
action’s being morally right will take care of this requirement. (2) It is not required for a
courageous action that it is possible for the agent not to perform it. What seems
necessary is that the agent performs his action willingly. He performs his action to
achieve some end. And as I suggested in the previous chapter (in support of Wallace),
this end must be one other than the avoidance of punishment. (3) It is not necessary for
an action’s being courageous that the agent justifiably believes that his end is worth
bringing about. Perhaps what is essential is that the action is morally right. (4) Finally, it
seems right to say that it is necessary for a courageous action that the agent justifiably
believes that there is a real danger in performing his action. This allows for courageous
actions in which there is no real danger present. Although, we 11 need a better
explanation of the types of dangers that count for courage. Perhaps allowing only those
dangers that threaten one’s well-being will suffice.
This concludes my evaluation of Plato, Wallace, and Walton on courage. These
preceding chapters are certainly not meant to be an exhaustive review ot all the
major
accounts of courage. Conspicuously absent are accounts proposed by Aristotle,
Kant,
and Aquinas, among others. However, I have limited my discussion to these three
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accounts because of their clarity and common features that I see as helpful in developing
my own account.
In the following chapter I will offer my own account of courage. The account that
I will offer will be successful only if it answers to the objections that I have proposed
against these preceding accounts. I will also consider some further objections that have
not come up for these accounts. Once I have defended my account, we will turn to the
main question of this thesis: Are suicide bombings courageous?
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CHAPTER 6
AN ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNT OF A COURAGEOUS ACTION
6.1: Introduction
In the preceding chapters, I argued that PACA, JWACA, and DWACA are not
adequate accounts of a courageous action. In arguing against these accounts, I made
some preliminary conclusions, which I believe will lead to a more accurate account of a
courageous action. I’ll present them again here: (1) While it is not necessary for an
action’s being courageous that the agent feels fear in performing it, 1 think it is necessary
that the agent justifiably believes that the action threatens his well-being. (2) Although it
does not seem necessary for an action’s being courageous that it be possible for the agent
not to perform it, I think it is necessary that the agent performs his action willingly. He
must perform his action to achieve some end. (3) I think that an action's being
courageous is linked more to its being morally right than its being worth performing. An
action’s being morally right will ensure, among other things, that rash actions are not
courageous. (4) Finally, following Wallace, an agent’s end in performing a courageous
action must be one other than the avoidance of punishment. This is because the
avoidance of punishment seems to be an unsatisfactory end for courageous actions.
In this chapter, I will expand on these conclusions and give some arguments to
support their plausibility. The end result will be a new set of necessary and sufficient
conditions for a courageous action. I will argue that this new account of a courageous
action is more accurate than the previous three since it is consistent with our
intuitions on
the courageous and non-courageous actions that we have previously discussed.
Once this
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account has been validated by producing satisfactory results on the previous cases. I’ll
then use it to answer the question of whether suicide bombings are courageous in the
final chapter.
6.2: Danger as Necessary for an Action’s Being Courageous
Although an agent’s feeling fear is not necessary for his action’s being
courageous, it does seem necessary there be some danger involved in performing his
action. Our previous three theories have had varying degrees of success in addressing
this requirement. PACA, by requiring only that the agent face some counterinfluences,
opposition, or discouragement allowed that some trivial dangers could be involved in
courageous actions, as in the case of Jim. JWACA, by requiring that the danger be
sufficiently formidable such that most people would find it difficult to perform the action,
excluded the courageous actions of people like our germ phobic woman. However,
JWACA’s definition of ‘danger’ as ‘anything that threatens one’s well-being’ seems to
describe the right type of danger involved in all courageous actions. Finally, DWACA’s
requirement that the agent justifiably believes that there is danger in performing his
action seems to be the most promising of the three, especially when filled out with
JWACA’s definition of ‘danger.’ I suggest that the following necessary condition, then,
is what we are after:
NCI. For any action, a
,
and any agent performing a , x, a is courageous
only ifx justifiably believes that performing a threatens x’s well-being.’
1
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x justifiably believes that P if, and only if, P is a belief that a reasonable person would form given the
evidence available to x (similar to Walton’s use of ‘justifiably believes ); a threatens x s well-being if, and
only if, it is likely that performing a will cause physical or psychological trauma to x.
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Now one possible worry is the fact that this condition allows that actions similar
to our germ phobic woman’s undergoing flooding treatment are courageous. Suppose
that Jim’s twin, Jerry, is even more neurotic than Jim about his baseball games. Jerry has
missed two games in the past and each time he has become physically sick and suffered
severe psychological trauma. And because Jerry knows this, it seems that he is justified
in believing that helping this pregnant woman threatens his well-being. And if this is
right, then it follows that Jerry’s missing the Red Sox game is a qualifying danger for a
courageous action. But one might argue that missing a baseball game is still too trivial a
danger to count for courage. But I would argue that Jerry’s missing the baseball game is
a qualifying danger (not a trivial one) because of the effect that this has on Jerry. Jerry’s
missing the baseball game threatens his physical and psychological conditions.
31 And
this is what distinguishes cases like Jerry’s from those like Jim’s. Jim’s missing the
baseball game is disappointing and discouraging, but it is not a threat to his well-being.
Therefore, Jim’s missing the ball game is not a qualifying danger for courage.
I would like to make two additional points for sake of clarity. First, my condition
does not require that the agent actually experience some harm to his physical or
psychological condition. Many courageous actions result in the agent escaping
unscathed, even though there is a real danger present. Let’s suppose that Jerry, although
there is a real threat to his well-being (it is likely that performing his action will harm his
physical or psychological condition), happens to perform his action without any harm.
31
I think we can construct a similar case with the character “Rain Man.” Rain Man is
neurotic about
watching his favorite television show, “The People’s Court.” He’s always worried about
getting home in
time to watch it. “Five minutes to Wapner,” he says frequently. Now suppose that Ram Man
and his
brother are walking home one day at about “five minutes to Wapner” when his brother
collapses. His
brother is in need of immediate assistance and Rain Man has to get help if his
brother is to survive. Rain
Man justifiably believes, based on past experience, that if he goes to get help,
he will suffer greatly horn
missing his show. So although missing “The People’s Court” would be trivial
to most of us, it is a real
threat to Rain Man’s well-being.
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However, the threat is real. In this case, we might say that Jerry has justified true belief
that his action threatens his well-being, even though he is not harmed. Second, my
condition allows cases where there is no actual threat to the agent. Cases like John’s
show that one can act courageously even when there is no threat to his well-being. That
is, there is no possibility that John will be severely harmed since there are no sharks in
the water. In John’s case, we might say that he has justified (but not true) belief that his
action threatens his well-being. Nevertheless his action is courageous.
So I think that my requirement that the agent justifiably believes that his action
threatens his well-being is promising for two main reasons. It allows that actions like that
of our germ phobic woman are courageous. These actions are courageous because they
are ones in which the agent faces some real threat to her well-being, even if these actions
would not pose a real threat to the well-being of many others. Also, my requirement
allows that actions like John’s are courageous. Even though John’s action does not pose
any real threat to his well-being, his evidence for believing this to be the case is
substantial. And his performing his action in spite of this justified belief is quite
impressive and courageous. And it is nonetheless courageous when we consider that
there was no real threat to his well-being.
6.3: Willingness as Necessary for an Action’s Being Courageous
We saw that one of the major shortcomings ofPACA is that it allows that actions
like Skittish’s are courageous. Any plausible account of a courageous action will need to
include a necessary condition for courageous actions that disqualifies actions
like
Skittish’s from being courageous. JWACA is successful in accomplishing this since it
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requires that the agent believe that it is possible for him not to perform his action.
DWACA is also successful since it requires that it actually be possible for the agent not
to perform his action. However, both of these theories yield other unsatisfactory results
since they do not recognize courageous actions like Stanton’s. It is not possible, nor does
Stanton believe that it is possible, for him not to perform his action. Yet his action is
clearly courageous. So we will need a necessary condition that excludes actions like
Skittish’s, yet admits actions like Stanton’s.
In order to formulate the required condition, we’ll need to address the difference
between Skittish’s and Stanton’s actions that accounts for our strong intuition that
Stanton’s action is courageous while Skittish’s action is not? Clearly there is no
difference in their external circumstances, nor in the way that they perceive them. They
both know that it is not possible for them not to perform their actions. The only critical
difference between these two actions is the attitudes of the agents toward their actions. I
think that Stanton is willing to perform his action while Skittish is not. I'll say a bit more
about the concept of willingness in just a minute, but let me first present our second
necessary condition for a courageous action:
NC2. For any action, a , and any agent performing a, x, a is courageous
only ifx performs a willingly.
I’ll now provide a brief sketch of what it means for an agent to perform his action
willingly. First, I think that one’s performing his action willingly is quite a different
thing from his having to perform it. And I do not think that the latter entails the former.
When I say that an agent is willing to perform his action, I mean that he wants to perform
it. His action is purposeful. He does it to achieve some end. And although a
willing
agent may have no choice but to perform his action, he is not forced to
perform it. On the
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other hand, one who does not perform his action willingly does not want to perform it.
He is forced to perform his action. He does not perform his action for some end. He
performs it because he has no choice. His action is not purposeful. This is evident in the
case of Skittish. While Skittish stands his ground in the face of some great danger, he
does not want to do this. He does not perform his action to achieve some end. He
performs his action because he is forced to do so. He wishes that he did not have to
perform it. This seems evident from the fact that had the trench been removed. Skittish
would have fled. So although Skittish performs his action, he does not do it willingly.
Stanton’s case if very different. Although Stanton has no choice but to perform his
action, he performs it willingly. He thinks it is good that he performs his action. He
wants to perform his action because he wants to do his duty. In this way, his action is
purposeful. And perhaps the best evidence of this is that had the trench been removed,
Stanton would have nevertheless stood his ground. Stanton clearly performs his action
willingly.
So in requiring that the agent performs his action willingly, I am requiring a
certain attitude of the agent toward his action. I am not requiring that it be possible for
him not to perform it, nor am I requiring that he believe this to be the case. 1 think that
my requirement best captures our intuitions about courageous actions. This seems right
when we consider the cases of Stanton and Skittish.
6.4: Moral Rightness as Necessary for an Action’s Being Courageous
While evaluating our previous accounts, it became apparent that requiring
that an
agent know, believe, or justifiably believe that his action is
worth performing led to
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serious problems. Knowledge and justified belief, we found, were overly restrictive,
while mere belief was too inclusive. And while it still might be the case that it is
necessary for an action s being courageous that it is worth performing, regardless of the
agent’s epistemic or doxastic state, I have suggested that this is probably not true either.
This is because there seem to be examples of courageous actions that are morally right
but not worth performing (good cop doing duty to save bad murderer). And so my
account of a courageous action will focus on moral rightness, not moral worth. However,
I think that the requirement that the agent know, believe, or justifiably believe that his
action is morally right creates similar problems to those created by the requirement that
the agent know, believe, or justifiably believe that his action is worth performing. 32 And
so I will argue that an action is courageous only if it is morally right. It is not required
that the agent know, believe, or justifiably believe this to be the case. Here, then, is our
third necessary condition for a courageous action:
NC3. For any action, a
,
a is courageous only if a is morally right.
Before I argue for this condition though, I first want to establish that courage is neither
co-intensional nor co-extensional with our best non-normative synonym for ‘courage,’
‘perseverance.’
Let’s consider what our best non-normative synonym is for ‘courage.' I suggest
that it is ‘perseverance.’ Recall Merriam-Webster’s definition of ‘persevere': “To persist
in a state, enterprise, or undertaking in spite of counterinfluences, opposition, or
32 A good example of this can be found in Jonathan Bennett’s paper “The Conscience of Huckleberry
Finn.” In this paper, it is argued that Huckleberry Finn believes that he is doing the morally wrong thing in
helping Jim to escape from slavery. However, in spite of the fact that Huck believes this, it still seems like
his action is courageous since he performs a morally right action in the face of some great danger.
This
seems to suggest that an action is courageous only if it is morally right. It is not required
that the agent
believes this to be the case. Thanks to Feldman for pointing this out to me.
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discouragement.” Now even for ‘perseverance’ this definition seems somewhat lacking.
For we wouldn’t want to say that someone who is forced to do something against his will
is persevering, nor would we want to say that one who faces a trivial danger or has an ill-
formed belief that he is facing danger is persevering. So it would seem appropriate to
make the same adjustments for this definition that we did for ‘courage.’ So we might say
that an action is persevering if, and only if, the agent justifiably believes that performing
his action threatens his well-being, and the action is directed toward some end. And
while it seems right that an action is courageous only if it meets these conditions, there
seems to be more required for it to be called ‘courageous.’ This would mean that these
two words are not co-extensional. However, before 1 go any further on this, let me first
show that they are not co-intensional.
In Principia Ethica
.
G.E. Moore presented a series of arguments to establish that
goodness is a simple non-natural property. This series of arguments came to be known as
the “Open Question Argument.” And while I believe that courage is a complex or
analyzable property and at least partly natural, I think I can use an argument similar to
Moore’s to establish that we mean something different from ‘persevering’ when we call
an action ‘courageous.’ Take the case of Marwan, which I presented in the beginning ot
this thesis. We can ask the following questions regarding the case: (1) Was Marwan s
action persevering? (2) Was Marwan’ s action courageous? Now I think that when we
ask question two, we have something different in mind from perseverance. For the
answer to question one is relatively straightforward, and we would answer it with a
resounding ‘yes.’ And while it might be the case that the answer to two is also ‘yes', the
fact that we do not see this as clearly as we did with question one suggests that we
mean
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something different from ‘persevering’ when we use the word ‘courageous.’ Moore says
something similar regarding the predicates ‘is good’ and ‘is what we desire to desire.’ He
writes:
It may indeed be true that what we desire to desire is always also good;
perhaps, even the converse may be true: but it is very doubtful whether
this is the case, and the mere fact that we understand very well what is
meant by doubting it, shews clearly that we have two different notions
before our minds. ( 1 6)
I think that Moore is suggesting the following. Perhaps it’s true that ‘is good’ and ‘is
what we desire to desire’ are co-extensional. While this might be true, most competent
speakers of our language doubt that this is the case. And we know that our doubting their
co-extensional ity means that they are not co-intensional. For if they were co-intensional,
or we meant the same when using each predicate, there would be no doubt about their co-
extensionality. This is because the fact that co-intensional words are co-extensional is a
necessary a priori truth. So assuming that we know what what we desire to desire
means, if it is co-intensional with ‘good’, then we should know without any hesitation
that these two predicates are also co-extensional. Similarly, assuming that we know what
‘persevering’ means, if it is co-intensional with courageous , then we should know
without any hesitation that they are also co-extensional. Here is a simplified
version of
the argument:
1. If ‘persevering’ and ‘courageous’ are co-intensional, then we
know
without hesitation that the answer to question two is
w
yes.
2. We do not know without hesitation that the answer to question two is
3. Therefore, ‘persevering’ and ‘courageous are not
co-intensional.
This argument is valid and it firmly establishes that ‘persevering’
and ‘courageous' are
not co-intensional. But are ‘persevering’ and ‘courageous’
co-extensional? In order to
57
better support my claim that courage, unlike perseverance, is an essentially normative
concept. I’ll need to show that this is also false.
As Moore suggested with ‘good’ and ‘what we desire to desire’, it might still be
the case that they are co-extensional, even if they are not co-intensional. 33 Could the
same be true of ‘persevering’ and ‘courageous’? Is it true that for any action, jc, x is
persevering if, and only if, x is courageous? 1 think a simple example will show this to be
false. Suppose that a robber holds up a bank so that he can make out with a lot of cash.
As it turns out, there is an undercover police officer in the bank. The police officer
stealthily unholsters his weapon and shoots the man in the leg just as the robber is leaving
with the money. The robber stumbles but continues to head for the door. The police
officer shoots him two more times, once in the back, and once in the buttocks. The
robber struggles to make it out the door and into his car. He drives away and is
successful in stealing the money. Now I think it is clear that the robber s action is
persevering. He knows that his holding up the bank threatens his well-being, and this
action is directed toward the end of getting money. Equally clear, though, is that it is not
courageous. This clearly proves that the two words are not co-extensional. Here is a
shorter version of the argument:
1. The robber’s action is persevering but not courageous.
2. If (1), then ‘persevering’ and ‘courageous’ are not co-extensional.
3. Therefore, ‘persevering’ and ‘courageous’ are not co-extensional.
This argument is valid and produces our desired conclusion that ‘persevering’ and
‘courageous’ are not co-extensional. And having shown that persevering and
‘courageous’ are neither co-intensional nor co-extensional, I now
want to argue that the
33
In “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” Quine pointed out that the expressions
‘creature with a heart and
‘creature with a kidney,’ although not co-intensional, are
co-extens.onal. That is, for any x, x is a creature
with a heart if, and only if, * is a creature with a kidney. Thanks to
Feldman for suggesting this point.
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reason for this is that an action is courageous only if it is morally right and it is directed
toward some good end. I’ll begin with the requirement of moral rightness.
I suggested earlier that our intuitions about whether an action is courageous are
swayed by our beliefs about their moral rightness. 1 think the reason for this is that when
we call an action ‘courageous,’ we are morally praising it. The action is morally
praiseworthy. And I think that if an action is morally praiseworthy, then it is morally
right. If this is correct, then an action is courageous only if it is morally right. I'll present
the argument and then follow with some support for it. We’ll call this the “Moral
Praiseworthiness Entails Moral Rightness Argument (MPEMRA).”
MPEMRA: For any action, cr.
1 . If a is courageous, then a is morally praiseworthy.
2. If a is morally praiseworthy, then a is morally right.
3. Therefore, if a is courageous, then a is morally right.
This argument validly concludes that if an action is courageous, then it is morally right.
Or, an action is courageous only if it is morally right. Let’s consider the plausibility ol
premise one. Consider again our use of ‘persevering’ and ‘courageous.’ Recall the story
of Prock (77-year-old drowning victim) as one of our paradigm courageous actions.
While it would be correct to say that Prock’s action was persevering, it seems like we
should say something more than this. It seems as though we are short-changing this
action if we call it ‘persevering.’ For our bank robber’s action was persevering and
Prock’s action is certainly deserving of more. This is because Prock s action is
morally
praiseworthy while the robber’s is not. This is why we call Prock’s action, and others
like it, ‘courageous.’ So I think it’s plausible that if an action is
courageous, then it is
morally praiseworthy.
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What about premise two? Couldn’t one argue that sometimes we do find agents
to be morally praiseworthy even when they commit morally wrong actions?34 Suppose
that a father wakes up late one night to some strange sounds coming from the first floor
of his house. His house has been broken into twice in the last two months. The most
recent time, his family was held at gun-point. He slowly descends down the stairs with a
pistol in his hand. He sees a dark silhouette holding what appears to be a gun. The
silhouette is about to enter his daughter’s room. The father fires and kills what he
believes to be an intruder. As it turns out, the silhouette was his son coming home late
from a party and going to talk to his sister. Now although the father’s action of killing
his son is morally wrong (he ought not to have done it), I think that we can say that he is
morally praiseworthy in some respect. What I mean is that his intention of protecting his
family is morally praiseworthy. And while I would agree with this assessment, 1 still do
not think that we would want to say that his action is morally praiseworthy. We don't
morally praise something that one ought not to have done? Generic praise works the
same way. Something is praiseworthy only if it is right. We want to reinforce the
rightness of the thing we are praising. Similarly, we extend moral praise to something
only if we think it is morally right. The father’s intention is morally right, so it is morally
praiseworthy. But his action is not. So I think it is right to say that moral
praiseworthiness entails moral rightness. Given that premises one and two are true, we
can conclude that an action is courageous only if it is morally right.
34 Suggested by Feldman.
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6.5: Avoidance of Punishment as Disqualifying for an Action's Being Courageous
I have suggested that, following Wallace, an action is courageous only if the
agent’s end is one other than the avoidance of punishment. This condition seems
plausible since it disqualifies actions like Smithers’ from being courageous. To be clear,
an action’s satisfying NC2 does not entail its satisfying this condition. That is, one could
perform his action willingly yet do so to avoid punishment. And in a case like this, it
would be correct to say that the agent performs his action to achieve some end. His
action is purposeful. However, the purpose or end of his action is to avoid punishment.
And actions with this end do not seem courageous. This is because the avoidance of
punishment seems to be an unsatisfactory end for courageous actions. Here, then, is our
final necessary condition for a courageous action:
NC4. For any action, a, and any agent performing a, x, a is courageous
only ifx performs a for an end other than the avoidance of punishment.
But why is the avoidance of punishment an unsatisfactory end for courageous
actions? I argued in the previous section that if an action is courageous, it is morally
praiseworthy. Assuming I am right, then the fact that a courageous action is morally
praiseworthy also lends support to NC4. This is because I think that if an action is
morally praiseworthy, then it must be the case that the agent performs his action for an
end other than the avoidance of punishment. To be clear, I think that it is possible tor an
action aimed at the avoidance of punishment to be morally right, but I do not think that it
is possible for it to be morally praiseworthy. Here is an argument to support NC4. We'll
call this the “Moral Praiseworthiness Entails No Avoidance of Punishment Argument
(MPENAPA)”:
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MPENAPA: For any action, «, and any agent performing a
,
jc:
1 • If a is courageous, then a is morally praiseworthy.
2. If a is morally praiseworthy, then x performs a for an end other than the
avoidance of punishment.
3. Therefore, a is courageous only ifx performs a for an end other than the
avoidance of punishment.
This argument validly concludes that NC4 is true. I have presented support for premise
one in the previous section, so I’ll limit my defense of this argument to providing support
for premise two. I think that the best support for premise two comes from our
consideration of Smithers’ action. Although Smithers’ action is morally right and it is
performed willingly, it still falls short of being morally praiseworthy. This is because an
action aimed at the avoidance of punishment seems to be too second-rate or inferior to be
considered morally praiseworthy. An action aimed at the avoidance of punishment might
be good enough to be morally right or permissible, but it seems that more is required for
it to be morally praiseworthy. So I think that NC4 is plausible.
6.6: The Full Account and Its Implications
In the previous sections of this chapter, I have argued the following: (1) An
action is courageous only if the agent justifiably believes that performing it threatens his
well-being. (2) An action is courageous only if the agent performs it willingly. (3) An
action is courageous only if it is morally right. (4) An action is courageous only it the
agent performs it for an end other than the avoidance of punishment. Now 1 want to
argue that these conditions are jointly sufficient for an action’s being courageous. I 11 do
this by applying my theory to the various actions that we have previously discussed. I 11
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show that my account matches up with our intuitions on these cases. First, here is my full
account stated formally:
l or any action, </, and any agent performing a, x, a is courageous if, and
only if: (1) x justifiably believes that performing a threatens x’s well-
being, (2) x performs a willingly, (3) a is morally right, and (4) x performs
a for an end other than the avoidance of punishment.
Now we can take a look at the implications of my account on our previously discussed
actions:
Action NCI NC2 NC3 NC4 Implication Intuition
Mike Yes Yes No Yes Not courageous Not courageous
Benavidez Yes Yes Yes Yes Courageous Courageous
Soldier Yes Yes Yes Yes Courageous Courageous
Jim No Yes Yes Yes Not courageous Not courageous
Frock Yes Yes Yes Yes Courageous Courageous
Skittish Yes No Yes Yes Not courageous Not courageous
Dan Yes Yes No Yes Not courageous Not courageous
Ron Yes Yes Yes Yes Courageous Courageous
Stanton Yes Yes Yes Yes Courageous Courageous
Germ Phobic Yes Yes Yes Yes Courageous Courageous
Randy Yes Yes No Yes Not courageous Not courageous
Sm ithers Yes Yes Yes No Not courageous Not courageous
John Yes Yes Yes Yes Courageous Courageous
Russ Yes Yes Yes Yes Courageous Courageous
Robber Yes Yes No Yes Not courageous Not courageous
Father Yes Yes No Yes Not courageous Not courageous
I think that this table supports my account of a courageous action. I hat is, the
implications of my account on all of our actions, match up with our intuitions on whether
or not the actions arc courageous. I'd like to spend the next lew paragraphs highlighting
some of these implications.
Let s begin with Ron's action. Ron s action satisfies NC 1 since lie knows that his
action threatens his well-being. There is a real threat of Ron’s being burned,
and Ron
knows this. 1 lis action satisfies NC2 since he performs his action willingly. I le performs
his action because he wants to do his duty. 1 lis action is purposeful.
Ron's action meets
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NC4 since it is not the case that Ron performs it to avoid punishment. Finally, Ron’s
action meets NC3 since it is morally right. His action is morally right because it is Ron’s
duty as a fireman to save these people. His action’s meeting NC3 is critical since, given
that his action meets the other three NCs, my account entails that Ron’s action is
courageous. So my account allows that Ron’s action is courageous while PACA,
JWACA, and DWACA do not. PACA requires that Ron know that his action is worth
the risks. JWACA requires that Ron believe that his action is worth the risks. And
DWACA requires that Ron justifiably believe that his action is worth the risks. And
clearly, none of these conditions are met since Ron does not believe that his action is
worth the risks. He believes that saving these meth dealers is not worth the risk of him
losing his life. However, his action is morally right since it is his duty to save them. And
so again, according to my account, it is courageous.
Another implication ofmy account concerning moral rightness can be seen in the
case of Randy. Randy’s action meets NCsl, 2, and 4 for the same reasons that Ron’s
does. However, my account says that Randy’s action is not courageous since it does not
meet NC3. Randy’s action is not morally right. This is because Randy ought not to have
taken an unnecessary risk. The morally right thing to do, given Randy’s knowledge,
would have been to enter the door that posed the least amount of risk. Randy’s entering
the door that he knew to be of greater risk shows that his action was rash or imprudent. It
was not the morally right thing to do. Because of this, his action was not courageous. So
because ofNC3, my account gets this case right.
My account also has the right implication for Stanton s action. Stanton s action
clearly satisfies NCI and NC3. Stanton knows that his action threatens his well-being.
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And his action is morally right. It is morally right since it is his duty as a soldier to stand
his ground. Furthermore, although it is not possible lor Stanton to do otherwise, my
account recognizes that his action is courageous since Stanton performs his action
willingly (NC2) and it is not the case that he does it to avoid punishment (NC4).
JWACA and DWACA get this case wrong. JWACA requires that Stanton believe that it
is possible for him not to perform his action. And DWACA requires that it actually be
possible for him not to perform it. Neither of these conditions is met in Stanton's case.
Thus, according to these theories, his action is not courageous. My account, because it
stresses the importance of willingness, not alternative possibilities, gets this case right.
Finally, I think that my account is well-supported by the implications that it has
on the germ phobic woman’s and John’s actions. I think that these actions are clearly
courageous, but accounts like JWACA fails to recognize this. My account recognizes
that the germ phobic woman’s action is courageous because, although her action would
not be a threat to the well-being of most people, it is a real threat to her well-being. So
this is an action that is very difficult for her to perform. It is a courageous one. And in
John's case, although there is no real threat to John's well-being (there are no sharks in
the water), his belief that his action does threaten his well-being is justified by the
evidence. So it is an appropriate belief. And this appropriate belief causes his action to
be very difficult for him. It certainly seems like a courageous one even though there is no
real threat present.
I think that the implications of my account shown in the above chart suggest that
my account of a courageous action is adequate. At the very least, they suggest that my
account is more plausible than the previous three theories. I have attempted to
reinforce
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this claim in these final paragraphs. In the next chapter, I will turn to the main question
of this thesis: Are suicide bombings courageous actions? Now that we have an adequate
account of a courageous action, this discussion should be somewhat straightforward. Of
course, we’ll need to make certain assumptions about some cases in order to generate any
results. I’ll begin with some straightforward cases before concluding with an evaluation
of Marwan’s action.
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CHAPTER 7
ARE SUICIDE BOMBINGS COURAGEOUS ACTIONS?
7.1: Introduction
Suicide bombings, at the very least, are very impressive actions. I do not mean
‘impressive’ in any evaluative sense, rather, I mean only that these actions have “the
power to excite attention” (Merriam-WebsterT But with this attention comes a great deal
of provocative and sometimes exaggerated rhetoric like the following. “Suicide bombers
are a bunch of crazy lunatics. Most don’t even realize what they’re doing. Furthermore,
when it comes right down to it, these actions are all suicides. And suicides, no matter
how you look at them, are morally wrong actions.” Now while it’s certainly true that
some suicide bombers are crazy lunatics, I think it’s reasonable to assume that some are
not. I stipulate that the agents of the suicide bombings that I will consider are not crazy
lunatics. I also assume that they know what they are doing in performing their actions.
Now if it’s true that all suicides are morally wrong, then the question of whether suicide
bombings are courageous actions, according to my account, is a non-starter. I make the
assumption that it is possible that some suicides are morally right. Now let’s begin with
our assessment of some specific cases of suicide bombings.
7.2: Non-Courageous Suicide Bombings
I think that there are suicide bombings in which the agent does not justifiably
believe that his action will threaten his well-being. This claim might sound rather odd at
first, but here is the type of case that I have in mind. Suppose that Samir is given a
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mission by his higher command to drop-off a backpack bomb in a crowed cafe. He is
told that the bomb will be detonated two minutes after he leaves the cafe. Now Samir
believes that his action poses no threat to his well-being since he believes that he will not
have any resistance in the cafe and that he will have plenty of time to get clear of the
building before the bomb detonates. Because of these beliefs, Samir’s action is rather
easy for him. In fact, it is a “walk in the park” compared to some of his past missions
against military targets. Samir’s bomb is detonated as soon as he walks into the cafe. It
turns out that Samir’s higher command has lied to him. Nevertheless, Samir action is
thought to be very courageous by his fellow fighters and family. However, as my
account suggests, Samir’s action is not courageous. And it is not courageous for at least
one reason. Samir’s action does not meet NCI . He does not justifiably believe that his
action threatens his well-being.
However, most suicide bombings are actions in which the agent does know that
his well-being is threatened. Consider the 9/1 1 terrorists attacks, specifically the suicide
bombing of “World Trade Center 1” by the terrorists aboard flight “AA 1 1 .” It’s
reasonable to assume that the actions of all of these men meet NCI . They all knew that
their actions threatened their well-being. But let’s consider the single action of one of
these men, Satam al-Suqami. Suppose that in Satam’s case, we allow that his action also
meets NC3. That is, his action is morally right. Let’s say that five minutes prior to
hitting their target Satam realized that he no longer wanted to go through with his action.
Let’s say that the fear just became too overwhelming. However, at this point. Satam
knew that it was not possible for him to do otherwise. Mohammed Atta was locked in the
cockpit and just minutes away from their target, so Satam was going to
participate in this
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suicide bombing in spite of the fact that he no longer wanted to do so. If this was indeed
the case, then we could say that Satam performed his action unwillingly. His action was
not purposeful. He did not want to perform it. His action was not directed toward any
end. And in this case, Satam’s action does not meet NCs2 and 4. His action does not
meet NC2 because Satam did not perform his action willingly. And it does not meet NC4
because Satam’s action had no end. Therefore, by my account, Satam’s action is not
courageous.
Now let’s consider the action of another of these terrorists, Waleed al-Shehri.
Let’s assume that, like Satam’s, Waleed’ s action is morally right. Therefore it meets
NCsl and 3. However, suppose that Waleed, unlike Satam, wanted to perform his
suicide bombing all the way through impact. He performed his action willingly. His
action was purposeful. It was done for an end. Like Satam, Waleed had no choice but to
perform his action, but Waleed was willing to do it. Therefore, Waleed' s action also
meets NC2. However, suppose that four days prior to his mission, Waleed was
considering whether to back out. And suppose that Mohammed Atta told him that it he
did not participate, he would be executed. And let’s say that this was Waleed s purpose
for going through with the mission, to avoid being executed. That is, the end of his
action was to avoid punishment. If this was the case, then Waleed’ s action does not meet
NC4. And therefore, his action is not courageous.
Let’s make some assumptions about another of these terrorists. Wail al-Shehri.
Suppose that Wail’s action, like Waleed’s, meets NCsl and 2. Wail knows that his action
threatens his well-being and he performs his action willingly. He does his action
for
some end. His action is purposeful. But suppose that, unlike Waleed’s,
Wail’s end is one
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other than to avoid punishment. We could even say that all the terrorists, including Wail,
were threatened with execution. But in Wail’s case, he does not perform his action to
avoid this punishment. He does it so that he can be with forty virgins after his death. So
Wail’s action also meets NC4. That is, Wail performs his action for an end other than the
avoidance of punishment. But what about NC3? Is Wail’s action morally right? Clearly
not. Wail’s action is morally wrong for at least this reason. Sacrificing one’s life for
some end, like being with forty virgins, seems to be rather indecent or base. At the very
least, it is misguided. And these are not things that we say about an action that is morally
right. Therefore, Wail’s action is morally wrong. It does not meet NC3. And therefore,
his action is not courageous.
Finally, we’ll consider the action of one more of these terrorists, Abdulaziz al-
Omari. Suppose that Abdulaziz’s action, like Wail’s, satisfies NCsl, 2, and 4. Abdulaziz
knows that his action threatens his well-being. And he performs his action willingly.
Like the others, he has no choice but to perform his action, but he does it for an end. His
action is purposeful. And furthermore, like Wail, Abdulaziz performs his action for an
end other than the avoidance of punishment. He too is threatened by Atta, but this is not
the reason that he performs his action. He performs his action because he wants his
family to enjoy great wealth and prosperity. Abdulaziz knows that the families of
martyrs enjoy all this and more. The leaders of Abdulaziz’s ensure that this happens. So
unlike Wail’s, Abdulaziz’s end does not seem like a base or indecent one. Rather, it
seems to be a good one. And while this is true, Abdulaziz’s action is still morally wrong.
It is morally wrong for at least this reason. Abdulaziz is deliberately killing innocent
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civilians to achieve his end. And while his end is good, the way that he pursues it is not.
Therefore, Abdulaziz s action does not meet NC3, and so his action is not courageous.
7.3: A Courageous Suicide Bombina?
Now let s return to Marwan’s action. Here is the full case again. Marwan is to
run into a military compound wearing an explosive vest in order to blow up a platoon of
enemy troops who are responsible for killing or capturing at least forty members of
Marwan’s tribe. Marwan wants to carry out this mission so that his tribe and family will
be safer. Marwan’s command has planned this mission so that no civilians will be
harmed, and Marwan knows this. Also, his command has rigged the vest to detonate if it
is removed. And his vest is set to detonate at 13:30:00, or at an earlier time if Marwan
triggers it. The day before the bombing, Marwan ponders his mission. Marwan knows
that this mission will mean certain death for him. Surprisingly though, Marwan is not
frightened by this thought. He is so focused on the details of his mission and so excited
by the thought that success will mean safety for his tribe and family, that he does not fear
dying. The next morning, Marwan awakens for his mission. He eats breakfast and prays
briefly. His serenity and lack of fear is astonishing. One hour prior to the mission, he
puts on his vest. At this point, there is no turning back. It is no longer possible for
Marwan not to perform his mission. Shortly after, Marwan is taken to the drop-off point.
He dismounts quickly and runs for the gate of the military compound. He manages to
avoid some heavy machine gun fire and quickly approaches his target. Marwan calmly
glances at his watch and notices that it is 13:29:55, five seconds prior to automatic
detonation. He knows now that he and his target will be blasted whether or not he wants
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to go though with it. But even this thought does not frighten Marwan. Marwan does
want to go through with it. Again, he wants to make sure that his tribe and family will be
safer. Marwan explodes and is successful in killing thirty enemy soldiers and himself.
Marwan is praised for his courageous action and considered a hero by his family and
tribe.
While it is clear that Marwan is fearless in performing his action, this fact, on my
account, is orthogonal to the question of whether his action is courageous. What is
essential is that he justifiably believes that his action threatens his well-being (NCI).
And this is certainly the case with Marwan’ s action. In fact, Marwan knows that his
action will kill him. So his action satisfies NCI . It is also true that Marwan has no
choice (at 1 3:29:55) but to perform his action. And it is true that Marwan knows this. At
this point, JWACA and DWACA would entail that his action is not courageous.
However, since Marwan performs his action willingly, it is still possible that his action is
courageous on my account. Marwan wants to perform his action even though he has no
choice but to perform it. He does it to achieve some end. And because his end is one
other than to avoid punishment, his action also satisfies NC4. Marwan performs his
action to make his tribe and family safer, not to avoid punishment. But the question of
whether Marwan’s action satisfies NC3 remains. Is Marwan’s action morally right? If
it’s not, then it must be for a different reason than the ones that disqualify Wail’s and
Abdulaziz’s actions. Wail’s action is morally wrong since he sacrifices his life to be with
forty virgins. His end is a base one. Abdulaziz’s action, although it is directed toward a
good end, is morally wrong since the means that he utilizes to achieve this end are
improper. But Marwan’s action is directed toward a good end, and Marwan does not
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target innocent civilians to achieve this end. I suppose it’s possible that Marwan’s action
is morally right. But perhaps his action is morally wrong because it breaks some
international law of war. Ultimately, I think the answer to whether Marwan's action is
morally right is unsettled. In order to answer this question, we need to know the correct
theory of moral rightness. And this project is beyond the scope of my thesis. But
according to my account, we can at least conclude this much. If Marwan’s action is
morally right, then it is courageous. If it is morally wrong, then it is not courageous.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION
In this thesis, I have argued that an action’s being courageous is conceptually
linked to its being: (NCI) a threat to the agent’s well-being, (NC2) willingly performed,
(NC3) morally right, and (NC4) done for an end other than the avoidance of punishment.
In arguing for (NCI), I suggested that our intuitions dictate that actions like the germ
phobic woman’s and John’s are courageous. NCI allows this. I supported NC2 by
suggesting that it is not essential to an action’s being courageous that the agent has
alternative actions available to him. Rather, what is essential is that the agent wants to
perform his action. He does it for some end. This is how we accounted for Stanton’s
action as courageous. And, I supported NCs3 and 4 by arguing that courageous actions
are morally praiseworthy. And that an action’s being morally praiseworthy entails that it
is morally right and done for an end other than the avoidance of punishment. I have
shown that my account is more plausible than PC, JWC, and DWC, since the
implications that it has on our paradigm cases mirror our intuitions on these same cases.
I also hope to have shown that my account is informative since it provides a clear set of
necessary and sufficient conditions, which has allowed us to determine whether certain
suicide bombings are courageous actions. Some of these cases, like that ot Marwan, are
still not clear, but I hope that this is now due more to our lack of understanding of moral
rightness than to our lack of understanding of courageous actions.
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